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  INTRODUCTION   
Empirical studies have shown that discrimination litigants 
face difficult odds.1 Indeed, less than 5% of all discrimination 
plaintiffs will ever achieve any form of litigated relief.2 In con-
trast, dismissals (on motions to dismiss or at summary judg-
ment) are extremely common in discrimination litigation, ac-
counting for a full 86% of litigated outcomes.3 These dismal 
odds are far more extreme than those faced by any other cate-
gory of federal litigant, with the sole exception of (notoriously 
unsuccessful) prisoner plaintiffs.4 Moreover, they extend to vir-
 
 1. See infra notes 27–33 and accompanying text. 
 2. Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Em-
ployment Discrimination in the Contemporary United States 17 (Am. B. Found., 
Research Paper No. 08-04, 2008) [hereinafter Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice], 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1093313; see 
also Katharine W. Hannaford, Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Em-
ployment Discrimination in the Contemporary U.S., RESEARCHING L., Spring 
2008 at 1, 3, available at http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/ 
documents/rlspring08.pdf (summarizing findings from Uncertain Justice re-
search project). Note that the above figures reflect only litigated (i.e., non-
settlement) outcomes. As set forth at greater length infra, those plaintiffs 
whose cases are resolved through settlement outcomes also achieve very lim-
ited levels of success, with the effective recovery (after attorneys’ fees and 
costs) for most plaintiffs ranging from approximately $7,000 at the EEOC level 
to $15,000 for cases filed in federal court. See infra note 49 and accompanying 
text. 
 3. See Hannaford, supra note 2 at 3; see also Nielsen et al., Uncertain 
Justice, supra note 2 at 17.  
 4. See Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Em-
ployment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 890 (2006). 
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tually every conceivable procedural juncture, from motions to 
dismiss to postverdict appeals.5 So what explains these results? 
Surprisingly, there have been few robust attempts to an-
swer this core question. Thus, while we have extensive data 
demonstrating that discrimination litigants fare poorly in the 
courts, we know very little about why. This Article—drawing on 
a heretofore underexplored area of the psychological litera-
ture—attempts to begin the process of filling this gap.6 Specifi-
 
 5. See Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice, supra note 2; see also infra notes 
44–45 and accompanying text. 
 6. In contrast to the overwhelming attention that has been paid in the 
legal literature to psychological findings regarding the phenomenon of implicit 
bias (also referred to as subconscious or subtle bias), very few legal scholars 
appear to even be aware of the psychological literature regarding attributions 
to discrimination. Thus, only a few legal scholars have discussed the studies 
described herein in any form, and none have fully addressed the profound im-
plications of these studies for understanding the difficult odds that discrimina-
tion litigants face. For the most extensive exploration to date of the psychology 
literature discussed herein and its potential implications for discrimination 
litigation in the context of a fascinating account of majority/minority gaps in 
perceptions of discrimination, see generally Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual 
Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (2008). For other articles relying on 
some of the studies described herein, see, for example, Deborah L. Brake, Per-
ceiving Subtle Sexism: Mapping the Social-Psychological Forces and Legal 
Narratives that Obscure Gender Bias, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 679, 698–711 
(2007) (relying on several of the studies discussed herein to help explain why 
people who have experienced subtle sex discrimination may not even perceive 
their experience as discriminatory); Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, 
The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 
900–05 (2008) (relying on several of the studies described herein in document-
ing the social costs of complaining about discrimination); Jonah Gelbach et al., 
Passive Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense to Pay Too Little?, 76 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 797, 841–42 (2009) (briefly summarizing certain of the studies 
described herein, and noting that the available evidence suggests that the 
tendency to “overlook or minimize discrimination” is more prevalent than the 
tendency to over-perceive discrimination); Elizabeth Hirsh & Christopher J. 
Lyons, Perceiving Discrimination on the Job: Legal Consciousness, Workplace 
Context, and the Construction of Race Discrimination, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
269, 271–74 (2010) (relying in part on some of the studies described herein in 
discussing the factors that influence the extent to which individuals interpret 
actions as discriminatory); Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A 
Social Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 
17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 19–24 (2011) (discussing certain portions of the liter-
ature described herein as well as related bodies of social psychological re-
search in discussing factors that may influence decision-making in discrimina-
tion cases). Compare Dhammika Dharmapala et al., Belief in a Just World, 
Blaming the Victim, and Hate Crime Statutes, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 311, 333–36 
(2009) (drawing on a related literature to articulate a theory of why hate crime 
statutes may be necessary in order to achieve optimal deterrence of crimes 
against minorities). 
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cally, this Article develops a new theoretical framework for un-
derstanding the difficulties that discrimination litigants face, 
based on the extensive findings of psychology scholars regard-
ing attributions to discrimination.7 As set forth below, these 
findings—which address in detail the circumstances in which 
individuals are willing (or, critically, are not willing) to charac-
terize a particular set of events as discrimination—have pro-
found implications for understanding the breadth and the na-
ture of the challenges that discrimination litigants face.8 
So what are the fundamental findings of this understudied 
area of psychological research? While the research hypotheses 
have been complex and varied, the core findings of psychology 
scholars have been remarkably simple: most people, in most 
factual circumstances, are unwilling to make robust attribu-
tions to discrimination.9 Indeed, even when there is substantial 
evidence of traditional invidious discriminatory intent (includ-
ing so-called direct evidence) most people will decline to make 
attributions to discrimination.10 This effect, moreover, is further 
accentuated outside of the context of stereotypical disparate 
treatment fact patterns (including, for example, circumstances 
where claims are based on disparate impact and/or involve 
nonstereotypical actors, such as minority-on-minority discrimi-
nation).11 Thus, across a wide array of factual circumstances—
ranging from traditional disparate treatment to more complex 
forms of bias—psychology scholars have documented that most 
people do not “see” discrimination, except where there is effec-
tively no plausible alternative.12 
This resistance to “seeing” discrimination appears to de-
rive, moreover, not—as some prior scholars have theorized—
from the specifics of discrimination doctrine, but instead from 
 
 7. “Attributions to discrimination” is the term of art used by psychology 
scholars to describe whether people characterize the cause of a particular neg-
ative outcome (e.g., termination, failure to hire, etc.) as being based on dis-
crimination (or conversely, as based on some other cause). See generally Bren-
da Major & Pamela J. Sawyer, Attributions to Discrimination: Antecedents and 
Consequences, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINA-
TION 89 (Todd D. Nelson ed., 2009) (providing an overview of the social psy-
chological literature regarding attributions to discrimination). 
 8. See infra notes 9–23 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra notes 53–81 and accompanying text. 
 10. See infra notes 58–81 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra notes 83–96 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 53–96 and accompanying text. 
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widely shared and deeply intractable background beliefs re-
garding discrimination and meritocracy in America.13 Thus, 
psychology scholars have documented that most individuals 
think of discrimination as a phenomenon that is explicit, re-
stricted in its manifestations, and generally unlikely to occur in 
America’s meritocratic society.14 These views, in turn, have 
been shown to significantly influence (and limit) most people’s 
willingness to make attributions to discrimination.15 As a re-
sult, in all but the most compelling factual circumstances, most 
people believe that some measure of merit—such as effort or 
ability—is a more likely explanation for why minorities fail 
than the possibility of discrimination.16  
There are profound reasons to believe that these prevalent 
background beliefs account, at least in part, for the dismal odds 
that discrimination litigants face in litigating actual cases in 
the courts.17 Indeed, the findings of psychology scholars—which 
strikingly parallel numerous aspects of the outcomes faced by 
discrimination litigants in the courts—are otherwise very diffi-
cult to explain.18 Moreover, recent experimental findings by law 
and psychology scholars provide strong reasons for believing 
that judges and jurors are, as a general matter, far from im-
mune from the influence of the types of background beliefs doc-
umented by psychology scholars.19 Thus, while further research 
is required to confirm the role of background beliefs in real-
world discrimination adjudications, there are significant reasons 
to—at a minimum—take seriously the work of psychology schol-
ars in assessing contemporary recommendations for reform. 
Doing so suggests a profound need to rethink existing 
scholarly recommendations for remedying the limitations of an-
ti-discrimination law. Most notably, the majority of contempo-
 
 13. See infra notes 98–152 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra notes 98–152 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 98–152 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 98–152 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 
58–82 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 153–76 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra Table 1 (summarizing the overlaps between the findings of 
psychology scholars and anti-discrimination case law / legal literature).  
 19. See infra notes 162–74 and accompanying text. Indeed, as set forth at 
greater length in Part III, judges appear to be surprisingly similar to lay popu-
lations in terms of the impact of background beliefs and other psychological 
factors on their decision-making approaches. See infra notes 171–74 and ac-
companying text. 
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rary scholarly proposals—most of which are focused on doctri-
nal reform of the anti-discrimination laws—seem likely to only 
exacerbate the documented tensions between prevailing public 
views and available claims, by further expanding the capa-
ciousness of contemporary discrimination doctrine.20 Indeed, to 
the extent that broadening doctrine encourages putative vic-
tims of discrimination to bring claims that diverge even further 
from common understandings of discrimination, these reform 
recommendations may result in increased losses for discrimina-
tion litigants, not greater victories.21  
Similarly, scholarly proposals focused on internal institu-
tional reform of private actors such as employers (an alterna-
tive that contemporary legal scholars have increasingly em-
braced), seem highly unlikely to result in improved outcomes 
for putative victims of discrimination if one credits this psycho-
logical account.22 Simply put, such institutional models—which 
rely on the willingness of employers and other institutional ac-
tors to “see” discrimination—have as their fundamental prem-
ise an assumption which the psychological literature tells us is 
very likely untrue.23 
The findings of psychology scholars thus suggest that—to 
the extent there is a desire to improve outcomes for putative 
victims of discrimination—there may be a need to cast the net 
more broadly, outside of the usual recommendations for reform. 
In this Article, I provide an initial discussion of one such alter-
native: increasing the use of litigation-based approaches that 
do not focus on group-based discrimination claims (i.e., ap-
proaches that do not focus on claims of discrimination based on 
race, sex, age, disability, etc.). I refer to these approaches—
which may include a diverse array of litigation-based claims 
ranging from “just cause” or “wrongful discharge” claims to the 
Family and Medical Leave Act—as “extra-discrimination reme-
dies” or “EDRs.” As set forth below, such EDRs, by decoupling 
the inquiry from highly charged views regarding the nature 
and extent of discrimination, seem uniquely poised to avoid 
 
 20. See infra notes 180–94 and accompanying text (discussing the limita-
tions of doctrinal reform approaches). 
 21. See infra notes 191–93 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 195–209 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra note 201 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 51–152 
and accompanying text (describing the findings of psychology scholars). 
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many of the obstacles that currently confront litigants in bring-
ing discrimination claims. 
This Article is organized as follows. In Part I, I provide an 
overview of the empirical findings of legal scholars regarding 
the low success rates of contemporary discrimination litigants, 
and discuss some of the most common explanations that have 
been posited for those low success rates. Part II examines the 
findings of psychology scholars regarding the pervasiveness of 
resistance to robust attributions to discrimination, and the 
causes of that resistance. Part III discusses the reasons why it 
is plausible to believe that the psychological phenomena dis-
cussed in Part II are at least partially responsible for the diffi-
culties that discrimination litigants currently face. Finally, 
Part IV discusses the implications of the foregoing for the lead-
ing reform recommendations among legal scholars of discrimi-
nation, and discusses the potential alternative of making in-
creased use of EDRs.  
A final note is in order, before proceeding to the substance 
of the discussion. While the psychological literature I describe 
herein provides an intuitively powerful model for understand-
ing why discrimination claims are so hard to win, it is not 
based on direct studies of judges or jurors in real-world litiga-
tion (and thus cannot directly address questions of causation in 
case outcomes).24 In addition, there are no doubt other factors 
that play a role in determining case outcomes (such as case 
merits) which this Article does not attempt to systematically 
address, except to explain the reasons why they cannot plausi-
 
 24. Relatedly, the psychological research I describe herein cannot fully 
answer why it is that discrimination litigants (and attorneys) continue to 
bring a category of cases that are so overwhelmingly unsuccessful. Whether or 
not the current success rates of discrimination litigants are caused by frivolous 
lawsuits, the influence of background beliefs of the type I describe here, or, 
most likely, some combination of factors, one would expect rational litigants 
and attorneys to respond to such profoundly low success rates by bringing 
fewer claims. Cf. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes 
for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17–20 (1984) (setting out theory of litigant 
behavior whereby litigated success rates should approach 50%, assuming ra-
tional actors and low litigant error rates in predicting success). A partial ex-
planation to this question may exist insofar as there are—unlike many other 
areas of the law—very few categories of discrimination cases that can safely be 
assured of success. See infra notes 40–46 and accompanying text (discussing 
the fact that many cases with significant indicia of merit are nonetheless dis-
missed). Thus, the only economically rational response may well be not to 
bring discrimination claims at all, a response that may be morally and person-
ally unacceptable to many discrimination litigators and plaintiffs.  
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bly explain the full breadth of adverse outcomes that we see.25 
Thus, this project represents an initial attempt to provide a 
theoretical framework for understanding the difficult odds 
faced by discrimination litigants (and to explore the potential 
implications of this framework), not an attempt to conclusively 
establish the scope of the influence of the phenomena discussed 
herein. Further research will be required in order to validate 
the extent to which this framework in fact explains the difficult 
challenges faced by contemporary discrimination litigants, as 
well as to flesh out the role of other factors that are contrib-
uting to the extremely adverse outcomes that discrimination 
litigants currently face.26  
I.  EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF OUTCOMES FOR 
DISCRIMINATION LITIGANTS   
As the work of numerous empirical scholars has demon-
strated, anti-discrimination litigants have a “tough row to 
hoe.”27 Indeed, of every 100 discrimination plaintiffs who liti-
 
 25. As described in Part I, existing data strongly suggest that neither 
merit—nor any of the other common explanations posited in the literature—
can provide a full explanation for the range of adverse outcomes that discrimi-
nation litigants face. See infra notes 36–50 and accompanying text.  
 26. Specific areas that could benefit from further empirical research in-
clude: (1) the role of merit in discrimination litigation outcomes (and the ex-
tent to which merit can be quantified through objective measures in the dis-
crimination context); (2) the extent to which EDRs are in fact more likely to 
succeed than discrimination causes of action (either in an experimental setting 
or in real-world contexts); and (3) the tendency of judges to show results simi-
lar to those described herein in lay populations. 
 27. Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimi-
nation Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 
(2004) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal 
Court]. A number of scholars have made important contributions to the bur-
geoning empirical research regarding the success rates of discrimination liti-
gants in the courts. See generally, e.g., Vivian Berger et al., Summary Judg-
ment Benchmarks for Settling Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 23 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45 (2005); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. 
Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to 
Worse, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103 (2009) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab, 
From Bad to Worse]; Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-
Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 556–60 (2003) [hereinafter Clermont et al., How Plaintiffs 
Fare on Appeal]; Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 
supra; Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appel-
late Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 
U. ILL. L. REV. 947 [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia]; Ruth 
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gate their claims to conclusion (i.e., do not settle or voluntarily 
dismiss their claims), only 4 achieve any form (de minimis or 
not) of relief.28 The other 96 of 100 see their claims rejected in 
their entirety: 45 of 100 have their claims dismissed on motions 
to dismiss, 41 of 100 are dismissed at summary judgment, and 
10 of 100 lose at trial.29 These odds can properly be character-
ized as shockingly bad, and extend (with minor differences) to 
every category of discrimination plaintiff, including race, sex, 
age, and disability.30 
 
Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 
OHIO ST. L.J. 239 (2001); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is 
the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
111 (2009); Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal 
Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights 
United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175 (2010) [hereinafter Nielsen et 
al., Individual Justice]; Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice, supra note 2; Wendy 
Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 889 (2006); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination 
Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001); Theodore Eisenberg & 
Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates Over Time, Across Case Catego-
ries, and Across Districts: An Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts 
(Cornell L. Sch., Research Paper No. 08-022, 2008) [hereinafter Eisenberg & 
Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=1138373. Most of these studies are focused on employment discrimination 
claims, by far the most common form of discrimination litigation. The few 
studies that have looked at other forms of discrimination claims have shown 
that those claims fare comparably to employment claims in terms of litigation 
outcomes. See, e.g., Clermont et al., How Plaintiffs Fare on Appeal, supra, at 
556–60, 562 (demonstrating that both jobs and non-jobs civil rights cases have 
very high rates of reversals of plaintiff victories on appeal, and that both cate-
gories of cases also have among the highest disparities between reversal rates 
for plaintiff and defendant victories of any doctrinal area); Clermont & Eisen-
berg, Plaintiphobia, supra, at 954, 967 (demonstrating that jobs and “other 
civil rights” cases have very similar rates of reversal of plaintiff victories on 
appeal, and also both have much lower rates of reversal of Defendant victories 
on appeal)); Eisenberg & Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates, supra, at 17–18 
(finding that summary judgment rates for both employment discrimination 
cases and other civil rights cases are consistently higher than summary judg-
ment rates in contracts and torts cases). 
 28. See Hannaford, supra note 2, at 3; see also Nielsen et al., Uncertain 
Justice, supra note 2, at 14, 17 (discussing results and noting that cases were 
coded as “dismissals” only where involuntarily dismissed). 
 29. See Hannaford, supra note 2, at 3; see also Nielsen et al., Uncertain 
Justice, supra note 2, at 17. 
 30. While scholars have shown that some classes of litigants—including 
African Americans and disability litigants—fare particularly poorly at certain 
junctures, including summary judgment, the overall win rates under different 
statutes are in fact remarkably similar. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to 
Worse, supra note 27, at 117 (Display 6). Notably, age discrimination claims—
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Figure 1 
Litigated Outcomes, Federal Employment Discrimination Cases 
1988–2003 
Data from Hannaford, supra note 2 
 
These abysmal results are bad not only in an absolute 
sense but also in comparative perspective. Discrimination 
plaintiffs fare far worse than virtually every other category of 
federal litigants, including even many categories of plaintiffs 
who face notoriously difficult legal standards (such as ERISA 
plaintiffs and habeas corpus litigants).31 The disparity in out-
 
which are often thought of as the easiest type of discrimination claims to 
win—are only marginally more likely to succeed than other classes of discrim-
ination claims. Id.; see also Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at 
189–92 (finding relatively little difference among success rates for different 
types of discrimination claims). 
 31. See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 27, at 
127–31 (demonstrating that employment discrimination litigants fare worse 
than other federal litigants across an array of contexts); Clermont & Schwab, 
How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, supra note 27, at 441–42 (finding that 
employment discrimination plaintiffs win less frequently than other plain-
tiffs); Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 27, at 954–55 (show-
ing that both employment discrimination plaintiffs and other civil rights 
plaintiffs have their victories reversed considerably more often than other 
classes of litigants, including habeas corpus litigants and ERISA plaintiffs). 
The fact that discrimination litigants fare worse—on average—than habeas 
corpus litigants is quite striking in view of the very difficult procedural and 
substantive hurdles to success that habeas litigants face. 
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comes between discrimination plaintiffs and other categories of 
federal litigants is also remarkably consistent, extending from 
the early stages of litigation through posttrial appeals.32 Thus, 
the extensive adverse outcomes faced by discrimination liti-
gants are virtually unique in the world of federal litigation, ex-
ceeding the negative outcomes faced by other litigants in both 
scope and degree.33 
 
Figure 2 
Litigation Losses, Federal Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What explains these negative results for discrimination 
plaintiffs? There have been—perhaps surprisingly—relatively 
few attempts to develop a robust response to this question. 
Thus, while there is a proliferation of scholarship richly ad-
dressing virtually every conceivable feature of anti-
discrimination law (from the narrow and doctrinal to the broad 
 
 32. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 27, at 127–
31; Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, supra note 27, 
at 441–42, 451; Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 27, at 954–
55; see also infra Figure 2. 
 33. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 27, at 127–
31; Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, supra note 27, 
at 441–42, 451; Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 27, at 954–
55; see also infra Figure 2. As noted above, only prisoner litigants fare worse 
as a class than discrimination litigants. See supra note 4 and accompanying 
text. 
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and theoretical), there are perplexingly few articles that make 
serious attempts to address this core concern. Indeed, the 
overwhelming majority of scholarly attempts to posit a cause 
for the difficult odds that discrimination litigants face are 
based on a loose, intuitive approach to understanding the phe-
nomenon, with little or no empirical foundation.34 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, many35 of these existing explana-
tions are a poor match for the actual experiences of discrimina-
tion litigants. For example, the explanation that has attracted 
the most attention among contemporary anti-discrimination 
 
 34. For example, some of the scholars who have done very sophisticated 
empirical work addressing the nature of outcomes for discrimination plaintiffs 
have tended to rely on a much more speculative approach to addressing the 
causation question. See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra 
note 27, at 112–14; Clermont et al., How Plaintiffs Fare on Appeal, supra note 
27, at 563–66. But cf. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Judge Harry 
Edwards: A Case In Point!, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1275, 1281–84 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Clermont & Eisenberg, Judge Harry Edwards] (taking a somewhat more 
systematic approach); Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 27 
(same). For some works that have taken a more systematic approach to the 
question of why discrimination claims succeed or fail see, for example, Colker, 
supra note 27; Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27; Nielsen et al., 
Uncertain Justice, supra note 2; Robinson, supra note 6. 
 35. Many, but not all. Perhaps most strikingly, many anti-discrimination 
scholars have argued—albeit without systematic empirical support—that fac-
tors like the background beliefs discussed infra Part II may be partially re-
sponsible for the low success rates that discrimination plaintiffs face. See, e.g., 
Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 45 (2006); Judith Olans Brown et al., Some 
Thoughts About Social Perception and Employment Discrimination Law: A 
Modest Proposal for Reopening the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 
1489–90 (1997); Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrench-
ment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. 
L. REV. 1331, 1378–81 (1988); Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and 
Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741, 789–90 (2005); Linda Ham-
ilton Krieger, Sociolegal Backlash, in BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTER-
PRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS 340, 358–61 (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003); 
Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Em-
pirical Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job 
Segregation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1160–61 (1992); Charles A. Sullivan, 
Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 
1665–66 (2011); Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix From The Ash: Proving Dis-
crimination By Comparators, 60 ALA. L. REV. 191, 224–26 (2009) [hereinafter 
Sullivan, The Phoenix]; Leland Ware, Inferring Intent from Proof of Pretext: 
Resolving the Summary Judgment Confusion in Employment Discrimination 
Cases Alleging Disparate Treatment, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 37, 39 
(2000). The work of psychology scholars that I describe herein can therefore be 
seen as complementary, and potentially confirming of the intuitions that have 
been expressed by a number of other discrimination scholars.  
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scholars—that we increasingly live in a world in which forms of 
bias are predominantly subtle or structural in nature—has sig-
nificant limitations as a global explanation for the difficulties 
that discrimination litigants face.36 For, while it is no doubt 
true that claims of structural and subtle bias are challenging to 
prove under contemporary anti-discrimination law, it is also 
true that even traditional disparate treatment claims face sig-
nificant difficulties in the courts.37 Indeed, scholars have shown 
by both quantitative and qualitative measures that even where 
there is significant evidence of traditional discriminatory ani-
mus, discrimination litigants continue to face extremely diffi-
cult odds.38  
Moreover, the premise of much scholarly work in this ar-
ea—that the adverse outcomes experienced by discrimination 
litigants arise from the relatively recent demise of old-
fashioned discriminatory animus—suffers from another signifi-
cant limitation. Specifically, its assumption that the outcomes 
faced by discrimination litigants are the result of recent change 
is inconsistent with the long-standing nature of the difficulties 
that discrimination litigants face. Indeed, discrimination liti-
gants have encountered difficult odds since at least the late 
1970s (when comprehensive data is first available), prior to the 
theorized rise in structural and “subtle” forms of bias.39 Thus, 
 
 36. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimina-
tion Mandate: Locating Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 854–64 
(2007); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive 
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1241 (1995); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employ-
ment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 459–64 
(2001); see also Bagenstos, supra note 35, at 1–3 (describing the contemporary 
trend); Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bi-
as, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1444–46 (2009) (same); Nielsen et al., Indi-
vidual Justice, supra note 27, at 176 (same). 
 37. See infra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 38. See, e.g., Catherine J. Lanctot, Secrets and Lies: The Need for a Defini-
tive Rule of Law in Pretext Cases, 61 LA. L. REV. 539, 540–41, 546 (2001); Niel-
sen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at 192; Elizabeth M. Schneider, 
The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 
RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 737–53 (2007); Leland Ware, Inferring Intent from Proof 
of Pretext: Resolving the Summary Judgment Confusion in Employment Dis-
crimination Cases Alleging Disparate Treatment, 4 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 
37, 39 (2000); see also infra note 42 and accompanying text.  
 39. See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 27, at 
106; see also Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice, supra note 2, at 24 (noting that 
despite the common perception that discrimination cases have been subject to 
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while the challenges of proving structural and subtle discrimi-
nation no doubt play a role in the adverse outcomes faced by 
discrimination litigants, they provide a fundamentally incom-
plete explanation for the globally negative results that have 
been documented by empirical scholars. 
Another common explanation—based principally on theo-
retical work from the law and economics wing of the legal acad-
emy—has been to theorize that the overwhelmingly negative 
outcomes that discrimination litigants face must arise from a 
concomitant lack of merit in discrimination claims.40 But, this 
explanation too is a poor “fit” for the actual results that we see 
in the courts. For example: 
 Empirical scholars have shown that objective measures 
of case merit (including for example, whether or not the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
made a “cause” finding, and the EEOC’s initial assess-
ment of the case’s merits) are not correlated to case out-
comes (including, for example, the likelihood of dismissal 
on motions to dismiss or summary judgment). Thus, even 
those cases that meet objective indicia of merit are sub-
jected to dismissal at very high rates.41  
 Qualitative research addressing the nature of the cases 
that are dismissed at summary judgment and on judg-
 
increasing dismissals in recent years as a result of changes in the political 
tenor of the judiciary, the data do not support the existence of such a trend). 
 40. See, e.g., Seth D. Harris, Disabilities Accommodations, Transaction 
Costs, and Mediation: Evidence from the EEOC’s Mediation Program, 13 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 41 n.146 (2008); cf. Selmi, supra note 27, at 569–71 
(considering, and ultimately rejecting, the possibility that the difficulties that 
discrimination litigants face may arise primarily from a surfeit of frivolous 
claims, but also noting that “it does seem, for whatever reason, that there are 
a fair number . . . of . . . discrimination cases that should never have been 
filed”). See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 24, at 4–5 (initial articulation 
of model often relied on by contemporary scholars in arguing that discrimina-
tion litigants must fare worse because of lack of merit). In addition to the lit-
erature cited herein, this assumption—that discrimination claims must be 
predominantly non-meritorious—is by far the most common response that I 
have informally received while discussing the profoundly low success rates of 
discrimination plaintiffs with other academics. 
 41. Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at 191, 193; see also 
Clermont & Eisenberg, Judge Harry Edwards, supra note 34, at 1282–83 (re-
sponding to Harry T. Edwards & Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (And Un-
supported Claims of Judicial Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (2002)) (conducting 
an initial assessment of one measure of merit on appeal and finding that it did 
not explain case outcomes). 
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ment as a matter of law has shown that many such cases 
are far from frivolous. Indeed, even those cases that have 
so-called direct evidence of discriminatory animus (for 
example explicit use of racial or gender-based epithets) 
are quite routinely dismissed at summary judgment and 
on judgment as a matter of law.42 
 Discrimination plaintiffs have far fewer trial victories 
(28%) than other categories of federal plaintiffs (45%), 
despite the fact that judges regularly grant motions to 
dismiss and motions for summary judgment in discrimi-
nation cases, thus presumably leaving only the strongest 
cases for trial.43 
 Even those few discrimination plaintiffs who win trial 
victories face a startlingly high rate of reversals during 
posttrial appeals (41%).44 This rate far exceeds the com-
 
 42. See, e.g., Kelly v. Moser, Patterson & Sheridan, LLP, 348 F. App’x 746, 
751 (3d Cir. 2009); Fitzgerald v. Action, Inc., 521 F.3d 867, 877 (8th Cir. 2008); 
Ramlet v. E.F. Johnson Co., 507 F.3d 1149, 1152–53 (8th Cir. 2007); Twymon 
v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 933–34 (8th Cir. 2006); Arraleh v. County 
of Ramsey, 461 F.3d 967, 976–78 (8th Cir. 2006); Mateu-Anderegg v. School 
Dist., 304 F.3d 618, 625 (7th Cir. 2002); Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 
F.3d 212, 224 (5th Cir. 2001); Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 
1210 (10th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Desert Palace, Inc. v. 
Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–102 (2003); Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1546–47 (10th 
Cir. 1993). Most of the cases cited herein were located through a quick search 
for “stray remarks” since this is often the rubric under which courts reject ex-
plicit evidence of discriminatory intent at summary judgment. While it is clear 
that summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law are not infrequently 
granted even in the presence of comments indicative of traditional invidious 
discriminatory intent, further research is required in order to systematically 
assess the extent to which this is true. For existing studies examining the cir-
cumstances under which summary judgment is granted in discrimination liti-
gation, see supra note 38 and accompanying text. See also Letter from Stephen 
B. Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Admin. of Justice, Univ. of Pa., to 
Peter G. McCabe, Sec’y, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Admin. 
Office of the U.S. Courts 10–12 (Jan. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Burbank Letter] 
(on file with the author) (discussing concerns regarding the possibility that 
judges in employment discrimination cases are engaging in a form of “cogni-
tive illiberalism” in adjudicating cases at summary judgment). 
 43. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 27, at 129; 
see also Parker, supra note 27, at 894, 921–24. 
 44. See Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 27, at 109; 
see also Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, supra note 
27, at 450 (finding slightly different, but comparable numbers); Clermont & 
Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 27, at 954–55 (same); Colker, supra note 
27, at 259–61, 271 (finding even worse post-trial odds for ADA plaintiffs, but 
based on a more limited sample). 
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parable reversal rate for discrimination defendants who 
have prevailed at trial (9%) and also very significantly 
exceeds the reversal rate for other classes of successful 
federal plaintiffs (28%).45 
Thus, while merit undoubtedly does play some role in the 
adverse outcomes that discrimination litigants face,46 it cannot 
provide a plausible explanation for the full range of adverse 
outcomes that discrimination litigants face. The adverse out-
comes are simply too broad—in both scope and depth—to be 
wholly attributed to a surfeit of frivolous claims. 
Finally, related to the “merit” hypothesis, it has sometimes 
been posited that the adverse litigation outcomes faced by dis-
crimination litigants must be the result of the settlement of 
meritorious claims, leaving only the worst cases for litigation.47 
But, in addition to the data discussed above (which show that it 
is not only nonmeritorious cases that face adverse outcomes), 
direct studies of discrimination settlements are fundamentally 
inconsistent with the premise that settlements represent the 
strongest subset of discrimination claims. Indeed, the only arti-
cle to have addressed this issue from an empirical (as opposed 
to theoretical) perspective found no consistent relationship be-
tween case merits and settlement.48 
Moreover, data regarding the average size of discrimina-
tion settlements reflects an average settlement recovery of only 
 
 45. Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 27, at 109 (rever-
sal rate for discrimination defendants who prevailed at trial); Clermont & Ei-
senberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 27, at 948 (reversal rate for federal plain-
tiffs in all cases); see also Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia, supra note 27, 
at 954–55 (showing that employment discrimination and other civil rights 
cases have the highest reversal rates of plaintiff victories of any category of 
federal cases). 
 46. There are two areas, in particular, where it seems likely that non-
meritorious cases play a significant role in the adverse outcomes that discrim-
ination litigants face: (1) early stage dismissals and (2) pro se claims. See, e.g., 
Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at 188–89. As noted previous-
ly, the role of merits in discrimination outcomes—and the extent to which 
merits can be objectively quantified in discrimination litigation—are both are-
as that are ripe for further scholarly inquiry. See supra note 26. 
 47. See Selmi, supra note 27, at 569; see also Harris, supra note 40, at 41 
n.146 (hypothesizing that discrimination plaintiffs may be systematically 
worse than discrimination Defendants at predicting litigation success and that 
this may lead to non-meritorious cases failing to settle). This is an explanation 
which has, again, been raised very frequently in my informal discussions with 
other legal scholars of the difficult odds that discrimination litigants face. 
 48. Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at 191. 
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$14,000 at the EEOC level and $30,000 in litigation—hardly 
what one would expect if settlements were among the most 
meritorious claims.49 In contrast, tried cases—while they also 
tend to result in relatively modest awards—have, on average, 
individual awards that are at least three to five times the size 
of the average settlement (and that are exclusive of attorneys’ 
fees and costs).50 Thus, the hypothesis of settlement drain of 
meritorious cases—while again perhaps a partial explanation—
is largely inconsistent with existing data regarding the nature 
of discrimination settlements.  
So if none of the foregoing explanations fit the data, what 
does explain the pervasiveness of unfavorable results for dis-
crimination plaintiffs? In the following two Parts, I explore at 
length another possible explanation: that the difficulties that 
discrimination litigants face arise—at least in part—from a 
much broader and deeper resistance among the American pub-
lic to making attributions to discrimination. As set forth in Part 
II, the findings of psychology scholars strongly support this ex-
planation, with experimental results showing again and again 
that most people are reluctant to make attributions to discrim-
ination, even where they are presented with quite explicit or 
objective evidence. In Part II, I detail the work of psychology 
scholars, followed by a discussion in Part III of the reasons why 
that work provides a compelling explanation for the very diffi-
cult odds that discrimination litigants face. 
 
 49. See, e.g., Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of 
Confidential Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
111, 144 (2007); Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at 187; Laura 
Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Scaling the Pyramid: A Sociolegal Model of 
Employment Discrimination Litigation, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 3, 22–23 (Laura Beth Nielsen 
& Robert L. Nelson eds., 2005); Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice, supra note 2, 
at 17. These figures probably reflect an actual recovery for discrimination liti-
gants of roughly $7000 (at the EEOC) to $15,000 (in litigation), given that 
they are inclusive of attorneys’ fees and costs. Interestingly, Professor Kotkin 
characterizes these results as showing a relatively high level of success for 
employment discrimination litigants, see Kotkin, supra, at 117, whereas Pro-
fessor Nielsen does not, see Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice, supra note 2, at 
17, 32–33. 
 50. Nielsen et al., Individual Justice, supra note 27, at 188; Nielsen & 
Nelson, supra note 49, at 28. This figure may significantly understate the dis-
parity between awards at settlement and at trial, as trial victors are also enti-
tled to a separate award of attorneys’ fees and costs, an award that can often 
significantly exceed the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff.  
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II.  FINDINGS OF PSYCHOLOGY SCHOLARS REGARDING 
ATTRIBUTIONS TO DISCRIMINATION   
Psychologists entered the research field of attributions to 
discrimination concerned primarily with the views of minority 
group members.51 Under what circumstances do minority group 
members attribute a particular set of events to discrimination? 
Based on the presumed psychological benefits of attributing 
negative outcomes to discrimination (as opposed, for example, 
to attributing a negative outcome to one’s own skill) and minor-
ity group members’ presumed repeated experience with dis-
crimination (leading to a heightened sensitivity to cues of dis-
crimination), scholars hypothesized a “hypervigilance” vis-à-vis 
discrimination, i.e., a tendency to make attributions to discrim-
ination where there is any plausible basis for doing so.52  
Ironically, the field of research that started out with a hy-
pothesis of hypervigilance has led to a vast array of findings of 
precisely the opposite phenomenon.53 While scholars have found 
support for the notion that members of minority groups are 
sometimes willing to make attributions to discrimination in 
situations of ambiguity, they have also found that they are 
even more likely to downplay and underestimate the likelihood 
that discrimination has occurred.54 These tendencies are, more-
over, even more pronounced among nonminority observers of 
discrimination (e.g., white male bystanders or jurors), who 
show an even lesser willingness to make attributions to dis-
crimination when they are asked to assess whether discrimina-
tion has occurred.55 Across all groups, the likelihood of making 
 
 51. See, e.g., Brenda Major et al., Antecedents and Consequences of Attrib-
utions to Discrimination: Theoretical and Empirical Advances, 34 ADVANCES 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 251, 258 (2002). 
 52. See, e.g., id. at 253–61, 266–68; see also GORDON ALLPORT, THE NA-
TURE OF PREJUDICE 144–45 (1979); Jennifer Crocker & Brenda Major, Social 
Stigma and Self-Esteem: The Self-Protective Properties of Stigma, 96 PSYCHOL. 
REV. 608, 612–13 (1989). 
 53. See, e.g., Major & Sawyer, supra note 7, at 91 (noting that the tenden-
cy to minimize discrimination is by now the “prevailing view among scholars”). 
See generally infra notes 59–96 and accompanying text for the specific find-
ings of scholars in this regard. 
 54. See infra notes 59–96 and accompanying text. 
 55. See e.g., Mary L. Inman, Do You See What I See?: Similarities and Dif-
ferences in Victims’ and Observers’ Perceptions of Discrimination, 19 SOC. 
COGNITION 521, 543 (2001); Mary L. Inman & Robert S. Baron, Influence of 
Prototypes on Perceptions of Prejudice, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
727, 728, 732, 736 (1996). See generally Robinson, supra note 6 (providing a 
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attributions to discrimination decreases even further under fac-
tual circumstances that do not closely resemble the stereotypi-
cal disparate treatment paradigm (e.g., no clear evidence of in-
tent, minority on minority discrimination).56 
What accounts for these counterintuitive findings? Psy-
chologists have hypothesized a number of possibilities, but 
leading among them are two basic theories: (1) that there is a 
tension between making attributions to discrimination and 
widely held American value systems, such as the belief that 
hard work gets you ahead in life; and (2) that due to cognitive 
factors, people’s preexisting prototypes of discrimination (typi-
cally narrow disparate treatment) and their beliefs about the 
commonality of discrimination (typically rare) have a signifi-
cant effect on the extent to which they make attributions to 
discrimination.57 Both of these theories have accumulated con-
siderable experimental support, and appear to be at least par-
tially responsible for the widespread reluctance to make attrib-
utions to discrimination that scholars have observed. Below, 
the basic “minimization” phenomenon is described, followed by 
a discussion of the principal causal factors for which there is 
substantial support in the literature. 
A. THE BASIC PHENOMENON: RESISTANCE TO ROBUST 
ATTRIBUTIONS TO DISCRIMINATION 
Across a wide variety of contexts, psychology scholars have 
found a pronounced unwillingness to make attributions to dis-
crimination, even in the presence of quite compelling facts. 
Consider, for example, the following experiment conducted by 
law and psychology scholars Tess Wilkenson-Ryan and Cathe-
rine Struve. Study participants were given a description of the 
facts underlying a hypothetical lawsuit alleging discriminatory 
failure to promote, and were asked to assess whether or not 
they would find discrimination. Inter alia study participants 
were told that58: 
 
fascinating account of majority/minority gaps in perceptions of discrimination).  
 56. See infra notes 82–96 and accompanying text. 
 57. See infra notes 97–153 and accompanying text. 
 58. All facts and results are drawn from Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Cathe-
rine Struve, Abstract and Study Format (on file with author). The results dis-
cussed here are based on a preliminary analysis by the study authors, and are 
subject to further revision/analysis. 
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 The Plaintiff (Anita) was explicitly told by her boss prior 
to the contested promotion decision that he wanted to 
replace the women in the workplace with men.  
 The Plaintiff was also told by her boss that “women 
should only be in subservient positions.” 
 The Plaintiff ’s boss told a co-worker directly that he 
would never promote Anita to the contested position.  
 A man who did not meet the posted qualifications for the 
job received the position, despite the fact that Anita (who 
did not receive the position) was qualified.  
Despite these overwhelming facts, when given a standard 
disparate treatment instruction,59 only roughly half (i.e., 51.4%) 
of mock jurors found in Anita’s favor. That is, close to 50% of all 
mock jurors did not consider this evidence to warrant a finding 
of liability.60  
Other experiments have found similar results. Thus, for 
example in a 1999 study,61 Teri Elkins and her colleague James 
Phillips found that—on average—study participants were not 
persuaded to make affirmative findings of discrimination, even 
in the presence of evidence demonstrating inter alia that: 
 The unsuccessful female promotion candidate was asked 
blatantly discriminatory questions during the job inter-
view such as “How do you intend to balance family obli-
 
 59. The full instruction given was as follows:  
To win on her claim of sex discrimination, Pace must prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that her sex was a determinative factor in 
PennDOT’s decision not to promote her to Contract Compliance In-
vestigator. ‘Determinative factor’ means that if not for Pace’s sex, she 
would have been promoted. Proof by a preponderance of the evidence 
means proof that shows that something is more likely true than not 
true. 
Id. 
 60. Id. The results set out in the text above are for the study condition in 
which study participants were given this instruction after the presentation of 
evidence (as opposed to both prior to and following the presentation of evi-
dence).  
 61. Teri J. Elkins & James S. Phillips, Evaluating Sex Discrimination 
Claims: The Mediating Role of Attributions, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 186, 194–
97 (1999) [hereinafter Elkins & Phillips, Evaluating Sex Discrimination 
Claims] (explaining and reporting results from the second of two studies); see 
also Teri J. Elkins & James S. Phillips, Global Air Corporation: Promotion 
Scenario #12 [hereinafter Elkins & Phillips, Study Promotion Scenario, Mod-
erate Evidence Condition] (unpublished promotion scenario providing a mod-
erate strength-of-evidence condition, used for Study 2 in Elkins & Phillips, 
Evaluating Sex Discrimination Claims, supra, at 194–97) (on file with author). 
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gations with the demands of the Chief Pilot position” and 
“Why would an attractive woman like you want to be a 
Chief Pilot anyway?”62 
 The HR manager who made the final decision to promote 
a man over the Plaintiff had previously made remarks to 
the effect that he preferred the “good old days when the 
men flew the planes and women smiled at the customers 
and served them lunch.”63 
 The HR manager who made the final decision to promote 
a man over the Plaintiff rejected the ranking of the job-
search committee (which had voted 2-1 in favor of the 
female candidate) after having a private meeting with 
the only member of the committee who had voted in fa-
vor of the successful male candidate.64 
 The only other time the HR manager had ever overruled 
the search committee’s recommendation in the past also 
resulted in a less highly ranked man being promoted to 
the position, in place of a woman.65 
Despite these compelling facts, study participants did not 
perceive discrimination as a particularly likely explanation for 
the non-selection of the female candidate. Indeed, the mean re-
sponses to the study questions assessing judgments of discrim-
ination were at exactly the scale mid-point used by the authors, 
indicating that—on average—study participants did not per-
ceive the conduct as affirmatively discriminatory.66 
In another study, Elkins and Phillips evaluated the will-
ingness of study participants to make attributions to discrimi-
nation under circumstances designed to more closely track the 
type of evidence typically available to the average discrimina-
tion claimant.67 Thus, they presented the Plaintiff as having 
 
 62. Elkins & Phillips, Study Promotion Scenario, Moderate Evidence 
Condition, supra note 61, at 10. 
 63. Id. at 8–9. 
 64. Id. at 5–6. 
 65. Id. at 9. 
 66. Id.; Elkins & Phillips, Evaluating Sex Discrimination Claims, supra 
note 61, at 195 tbl.4.  
 67. Teri J. Elkins et al., Gender-Related Biases in Evaluations of Sex Dis-
crimination Allegations: Is Perceived Threat the Key?, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
280, 283 (2002) [hereinafter Elkins et al., Gender-Related Biases] (explaining 
and reporting results from the first of three studies); see also Teri J. Elkins et 
al., Dorothy Patterson (Plaintiff ) v. Global Airlines (Defendant): Promotion 
Scenario #12 [hereinafter Elkins et al., Study Promotion Scenario, Female Pi-
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made out a prima facie case (as part of which, the Plaintiff pre-
sented some evidence of more favorable treatment of non-
minorities), and also as having presented moderately strong ev-
idence that the reason given for the adverse employment deci-
sion was pretextual.68 This evidence is technically sufficient to 
make out a discrimination case under the McDonnell Doug-
las69/Burdine70 framework, and given the legal incentives not to 
make blatantly biased statements, may be the only evidence 
that is available to a victim of discrimination.71 Nevertheless, it 
is apparently unpersuasive to many observers—Elkins and 
Phillips found that the mean study participant assessed dis-
crimination at only a 3.10 on a 7-point scale (reflecting a judg-
ment that discrimination had not occurred).72 
A number of other scholars, instead of asking study partic-
ipants to evaluate whether they would find discrimination in a 
hypothetical scenario, have experimentally manipulated partic-
ipants’ environments to include information that might cause a 
reasonable observer to conclude that there was discrimination. 
Although these experiments have taken a variety of forms, the 
 
lot Condition] (unpublished study promotion scenario wherein a female candi-
date for chief pilot is passed over for promotion, used in Study 1 in Elkins et 
al., Gender-Related Biases, supra, at 283) (on file with author).  
 68. Elkins et al., Study Promotion Scenario, Female Pilot Condition, su-
pra note 67, at 1–5. 
 69. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  
 70. Tex. Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). 
 71. Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework, a jury can find 
discrimination, although they need not do so, where a plaintiff has come for-
ward with a prima facie case, coupled with evidence of pretext (i.e., evidence 
showing that the employer’s stated reason is false). See Reeves v. Sanderson 
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142–43 (2000). While the elements of an 
employment discrimination prima facie case differ depending on the context of 
the case, they commonly center on a showing that one or more nonminorities 
were treated more favorably (either because they got the contested position, 
or, in the case of a termination or demotion, because they were not terminated 
or demoted in similar circumstances). Evidence of pretext can also vary wide-
ly, but often focuses on inconsistencies in the employer’s explanation or a 
showing that the reason put forward is factually false. 
 72. Elkins et al., Gender-Related Biases, supra note 67, at 283. The results 
of this study highlight the extent of the mismatch between how the public per-
ceives discrimination and what is legally sufficient to make out a case of dis-
crimination based on the Supreme Court’s precedents. It may be that this 
mismatch is part of what is driving high rates of summary judgment grants in 
circumstances where it seems unwarranted given existing law. Cf. Krieger, 
supra note 35, at 341 (making a similar argument in relation to the judicial 
backlash against the ADA). 
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most common design involves a variation on the following set of 
facts (hereinafter “biased testing” design): 
Experiment participants are asked to take a test with the possibility 
of subjective scoring (often a creativity test). They are told that the 
test is a predictor of future success and that the person who scores 
best on the test will receive some benefit (typically an opportunity to 
win a sum of money). After the tests have been submitted for grading, 
a confederate (who appears to the other participants to be just anoth-
er participant) makes a statement to the effect that she knows the 
person who will be grading the exams to be biased against a particu-
lar group (typically women or African Americans), and that she 
doesn’t believe he’ll say a (woman/minority) got the best score. The 
(female/minority) participants then receive negative feedback on their 
exams, and a (man/white student) is audibly told that he or she re-
ceived the highest score and hence the prize.73 
These scenarios, like the studies described supra, contain 
significantly more explicit evidence of discrimination than ex-
ists in many real-life contexts. Nevertheless, most scholars 
have found that many “observers” and “victims” are unwilling 
to make attributions to discrimination on this basic set of facts, 
and instead attribute the failure of the women and minority 
participants primarily to factors internal to the victims (such as 
ability, effort, etc.).74 
Perhaps the most intriguing evidence that scholars have 
found of a “minimization” effect has come from experiments 
giving subjects an objective measure of the likelihood that they 
 
 73. The following articles, among others, rely on some version of this ex-
perimental scenario: Wayne H. Bylsma et al., The Influence of Legitimacy Ap-
praisals on the Determinants of Entitlement Beliefs, 17 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 223, 228–29 (1995); Brenda Major et al., Attributions to Discrimina-
tion and Self-Esteem: Impact of Group Identification and Situational Ambigui-
ty, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 220, 224 (2003); Robin E. Roy et al., If 
She’s a Feminist It Must Not Be Discrimination: The Power of the Feminist 
Label on Observers’ Attributions About a Sexist Event, 60 SEX ROLES 422, 
424–25 (2009); Anna Berlin, The Effects of Differential Discrimination Cues 
on Attributions for Failure: Implications for Subsequent Performance 35–39 
(Aug. 2006) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Ohio University), available at http://etd 
.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Berlin%20Anna.pdf?ohiou1156451468. 
 74. See, e.g., Bylsma et al., supra note 73, at 229–30 (finding that the av-
erage participant attributed to discrimination at less than the scale midpoint, 
indicating belief that discrimination had not occurred); Roy et al., supra note 
73, at 429 (discussing low levels of attributions to discrimination across study 
conditions); Berlin, supra note 73, at 40 tbl.1 (reporting that study partici-
pants attributed a larger proportion of outcome to effort and ability than to 
discrimination in most experimental conditions, and that across all conditions, 
subjects reported on average that they disagreed that discrimination had oc-
curred). 
 1298 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1275 
 
have been subjected to discrimination.75 Following a similar 
procedure to the “biased testing” design, study participants 
(women or racial minorities) take an exam or write an essay 
with the potential for subjective grading, that they believe to be 
predictive of ability.76 They are then told by a confederate (who 
they believe to be the experimenter’s assistant) that all of the 
judges are majority group members (men or whites, depending 
on the study design) and that either all, none, or some propor-
tion of them (depending on the study, 25%, 50% or 75%) dis-
criminate against minorities.77 The minority participants then 
are given their test with a failing grade marked on it.78  
Despite the seeming objectivity of the information that 
subjects receive regarding the likelihood of discrimination, 
scholars have consistently found that subjects attribute their 
failure significantly less to discrimination than would be ex-
pected based on the data that they have been given. For exam-
ple, Karen Ruggiero and Donald Taylor found that subjects 
made attributions to discrimination at very low levels (roughly 
averaging a three on a ten-point scale), in any context where 
the certainty of discrimination was less than 100% (but greater 
 
 75. Much of the pertinent research relating to objective measures of the 
probability of discrimination was conducted by Karen Ruggiero, then a leading 
scholar in the field of perception of discrimination. Karen Ruggiero was subse-
quently forced to resign from her position as a professor at University of Texas 
at Austin, as a result of the falsification of data in certain studies that she 
conducted, which led to the retraction of a number of her publications. The two 
pieces that are relied on herein were not retracted and continue to be regular-
ly relied on in the social psychology literature. In addition, Ruggiero’s co-
author (Donald Taylor), who has never been the subject of any accusations of 
misconduct, has verified the genuineness of the data that was relied on in the 
analyses discussed herein. See Robinson, supra note 6, at 1142 n.227. 
 76. Karen M. Ruggiero & Donald M. Taylor, Coping With Discrimination: 
How Disadvantaged Group Members Perceive the Discrimination That Con-
fronts Them, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 826, 828, 832–833 (1995) 
[hereinafter Ruggiero & Taylor, Coping With Discrimination] ( leading article 
to employ this methodology); see also Karen M. Ruggiero & Donald M. Taylor, 
Why Minority Group Members Perceive or Do Not Perceive the Discrimination 
That Confronts Them: The Role of Self-Esteem and Perceived Control, 72 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 373, 377, 381 (1997) [hereinafter Ruggiero & 
Taylor, Why Minority Group Members Perceive Discrimination] (employing a 
similar study design).  
 77. See Ruggiero & Taylor, Coping With Discrimination, supra note 76, at 
828–29, 832–34; Ruggiero & Taylor, Why Minority Group Members Perceive 
Discrimination, supra note 76, at 377–78, 381–82. 
 78. See sources cited supra note 77. 
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than 0%).79 Moreover, most subjects significantly attributed 
their failure to the quality of their answers (roughly a seven on 
a ten-point scale), even in circumstances where they were told 
it was highly likely that they had been subjected to discrimina-
tion.80 Indeed, even in the circumstance where participants 
were told it was a certainty (100%) that their test was graded 
by a person who discriminates, they continued to significantly 
attribute their grade to the quality of their answers, and rated 
the likelihood of discrimination only slightly to somewhat above 
the scale midpoint.81  
Collectively, then, psychology scholars have found exten-
sive support for the conclusion that people are reluctant to 
make attributions to discrimination, even in the presence of 
compelling “direct” evidence, and even when given objective 
measures of the likelihood that discrimination has occurred.82 
 
 79. See sources cited supra note 77. 
 80. See sources cited supra note 77. 
 81. See sources cited supra note 77; accord Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. 
Miller, Reacting to Impending Discrimination: Compensation for Prejudice & 
Attributions to Discrimination, 27 PERSONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1357, 
1364 (2001). Although Kaiser and Miller’s data showed a substantial minimi-
zation effect for the 100% condition, they did not show a substantial minimiza-
tion effect for the 50% condition. Id. 
 82. In addition to the literature specifically discussed above, a significant 
number of other studies have found substantial tendencies to discount or 
downplay the likelihood of discrimination, even where there are significant 
objective indicators that discrimination has occurred. See Christia Spears 
Brown & Rebecca S. Bigler, Children’s Perceptions of Gender Discrimination, 
40 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 714, 722 (2004); Don Operario & Susan T. 
Fiske, Ethnic Identity Moderates Perceptions of Prejudice: Judgments of Per-
sonal Versus Group Discrimination and Subtle Versus Blatant Bias, 27 PER-
SONALITY SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 550, 557 (2001); Gretchen Sechrist et al., 
When Do the Stigmatized Make Attributions to Discrimination Occurring to the 
Self and Others? The Roles of Self-Presentation and the Need for Control, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 111, 117 (2004); Janet K. Swim et al., The Role 
of Intent and Harm in Judgments of Prejudice and Discrimination, 84 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 944, 954 (2003) [hereinafter Swim et al., Judg-
ments of Prejudice]; see also Faye Crosby, The Denial of Personal Discrimina-
tion, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 371, 376 (1984) (noting that although working 
women are likely to be victims of discrimination “they showed few signs of 
feeling personally discriminated against”); Yumiko Nishimuta, The Interpreta-
tion of Racial Encounters: Japanese Students in Britain, 34 J. ETHNIC & MI-
GRATION STUD. 133, 143–47 (2008) (analyzing the responses of study partici-
pants who reported experiencing discrimination, but failed to characterize the 
experience as such); Jacquie D. Vorauer & Sandra M. Kumhyr, Is This About 
You or Me? Self- Versus Other-Directed Judgments and Feelings in Response to 
Intergroup Interaction, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 706, 713 
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This general tendency to discount the possibility of discrimina-
tion becomes even more pronounced outside of the stereotypical 
disparate treatment context.83 Indeed, it appears that a variety 
of contextual factors, including the perceived intent of the ac-
tor, the good faith nature of stereotype-driven behavior, and the 
identity of the actors play a critical role in moderating attribu-
tions to discrimination.84  
Perhaps the most striking finding of psychology scholars in 
this regard is that the intent of the perpetrator is a critical de-
terminant of observers’ willingness to make attributions to dis-
crimination. For example, a 2003 study by Janet K. Swim and 
colleagues presented participants with a series of vignettes in 
which both the intent of the actor and the harm to the victim 
were varied across conditions.85 They found that people were 
consistently more reluctant to label as discrimination scenarios 
in which the actor was portrayed as lacking intent to harm mi-
nority group members, or having acted in a thoughtless or ste-
reotyped (but not deliberately malicious) way.86 This effect, 
moreover, extended to those circumstances where minority 
group members were significantly harmed as a result of the ac-
tor’s treatment.87 
Other scholars have found similar results, showing that 
people are extremely reluctant to make findings of discrimina-
tion in what might be thought of as classic “disparate impact” 
contexts. Thus, for example, Foster and Dion found that people 
were very reluctant to make attributions to discrimination in a 
context where they were told that women fared worse than men 
on a particular test, but there was no clear evidence of intent.88 
Similarly, Kappen and Branscombe found that exclusion based 
on inadequate height and weight—factors that the Supreme 
 
(2001) (experimentally finding that members of minority groups did not assess 
high prejudice and low prejudice conversation partners differently, despite the 
fact that those exposed to high prejudice partners experienced significantly 
greater discomfort and self-directed negativity). 
 83. See infra notes 85–94 and accompanying text. 
 84. See infra notes 85–96 and accompanying text. 
 85. See Swim et al., Judgments of Prejudice, supra note 82, at 958–59 
(appendix containing the study vignettes used).  
 86. Id. at 951–52. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Mindi D. Foster & Kenneth L. Dion, The Role of Hardiness in 
Moderating the Relationship Between Global/Specific Attributions and Actions 
Against Discrimination, 51 SEX ROLES 161, 164–66 (2004). 
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Court has acknowledged have a disparate impact against wom-
en—are generally not perceived by subjects as discriminatory.89 
Thus, it appears that most subjects simply do not perceive non-
intended acts as discriminatory, even where they adversely im-
pact minority groups.90 
The extent of harm to the victim has also been found to 
have a significant impact on willingness to make judgments of 
discrimination, particularly under circumstances of ambiguous 
intent. Thus, where subjects are told that a particular incident 
resulted in no concrete harm to the victim—and are given no 
information about intent—they are much less likely to make 
attributions to discrimination.91 Similarly, subjects much more 
rarely characterize forms of disparate treatment with mixed 
harm implications for victims—such as “benevolent” sexism or 
paternalism—as discrimination.92 
The identities of the actor and the victim have also been 
found to have substantial effects on the frequency with which 
people make attributions to discrimination. Thus, people are 
significantly more likely to make attributions to discrimination 
where the scenario described involves a “classic” disparate 
treatment dyad (e.g., a man discriminating against a woman or 
 
 89. See Diane M. Kappen & Nyla R. Branscombe, The Effects of Reasons 
Given for Ineligibility on Perceived Gender Discrimination and Feelings of In-
justice, 40 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 295, 300, 302 (2001); see also Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328–31 (1977) (recognizing that height and weight 
qualifications can have a disparate impact on women). 
 90. Indeed, one scholar found that subjects expressed confusion and diffi-
culty in following instructions when they were instructed to make attributions 
to discrimination based on a disparate impact paradigm. See E-mail from Lau-
rie T. O’Brien, Assistant Professor, Tulane Univ. to Katie R. Eyer, Research 
Scholar, Univ. of Pa. (Sept. 11, 2009, 15:04:21 EST) (on file with author). 
 91. E.g., Swim et al., Judgments of Prejudice, supra note 82, at 951 fig.2 
(finding study subjects rated the attribution to discrimination at only 2.08 on a 
seven-point scale in no-harm condition, whereas the mean attribution for high-
harm condition was 3.92). 
 92. E.g., Lisa Feldman Barrett & Janet K. Swim, Appraisals of Prejudice 
and Discrimination, in PREJUDICE: THE TARGET’S PERSPECTIVE 11, 22 (1998) 
(“[T]he positive aspects of benevolent forms of discrimination such as paternal-
ism may make it difficult for people to recognize this . . . as indicative of preju-
dice.” (citations omitted)); Janet K. Swim et al., Judgments of Sexism: A Com-
parison of the Subtlety of Sexism Measures and Sources of Variability in 
Judgments of Sexism, 29 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 406, 409 (2005) [hereinafter 
Swim et al., Judgments of Sexism] (reporting that respondents were unlikely 
to perceive benevolent sexist attitudes as sexist). 
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a white person discriminating against a racial minority).93 Out-
side of these “classic” discrimination scenarios (for example in 
the minority on minority discrimination context), observers are 
far less likely to make attributions to discrimination.94 
Finally, the perceived controllability of the victim’s stigma-
tized status appears to have a significant effect on people’s will-
ingness to make attributions to discrimination, and the extent 
to which differential treatment is perceived as legitimate. Thus, 
people make fewer attributions to discrimination (and are more 
likely to characterize differential treatment as legitimate) 
where the basis for stigmatization is perceived to be within the 
victim’s control.95 As a result, differential treatment of certain 
groups (such as the overweight, those with certain mental and 
physical disabilities, and gays and lesbians) is less likely to be 
interpreted as discriminatory, and more likely to be viewed as 
justified, than discrimination against groups whose statuses 
are perceived as immutable (e.g., women, African Americans).96 
 
 93. E.g., Derek R. Avery et al., What Are the Odds? How Demographic 
Similarity Affects the Prevalence of Perceived Employment Discrimination, 93 
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 235, 236 (2008); Inman & Baron, supra note 55, at 732; 
Angela J. Krumm & Alexandra F. Corning, Perceived Control as a Moderator 
of the Prototype Effect in the Perception of Discrimination, 38 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1109, 1110–12 (2008); Major & Sawyer, supra note 7, at 94–95. 
 94. E.g., Inman & Baron, supra note 55, at 732.  
 95. E.g., Major et al., supra note 51, at 288–89; Major & Sawyer, supra 
note 7, at 98; see also Bruce Blaine & Zoe Williams, Belief in the Controllabil-
ity of Weight and Attributions to Prejudice Among Heavyweight Women, 51 
SEX ROLES 79, 83 (2004) (finding that priming participants with materials 
emphasizing the controllability of weight decreased overweight individuals’ 
tendency to characterize their rejection as based on prejudice); Jennifer 
Crocker et al., The Stigma of Overweight: Affective Consequences of 
Attributional Ambiguity, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 60, 66 (1993) 
(finding overweight women–while attributing their rejection to their weight–
did not characterize this rejection as discriminatory). 
 96. See, e.g., Crocker et al., supra note 95, at 66; Major et al., supra note 
51, at 288–89; Bernard Weiner et al., An Attributional Analysis of Reactions to 
Stigmas, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 738, 740–41, 745–46 (1988) (re-
porting that study participants had more positive reactions to individuals with 
disabilities that were perceived as being outside of the individual’s control); see 
also Donald P. Haider-Markel & Mark R. Joslyn, Attributions and the Regula-
tion of Marriage: Considering the Parallels Between Race and Homosexuality, 
38 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 233, 236 (2005) (finding that opposition to a ban on 
gay marriage correlates with the belief that sexual orientation is attributable 
to biological origins); Donald P. Haider-Markel & Mark R. Joslyn, Beliefs 
About the Origins of Homosexuality and Support for Gay Rights, 72 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 291, 300 tbl.2 (2008) (same); Ryan M. Quist & Douglas M. 
Wiegand, Attributions of Hate: The Media’s Causal Attributions of a Homo-
 2012] LIMITS OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 1303 
 
B. REASONS FOR THE BASIC PHENOMENON 
Why do people resist making attributions to discrimina-
tion, particularly outside of the classic disparate treatment con-
text? Research by psychology scholars suggests a major role for 
two key psychological factors: (1) the tension between wide-
spread American belief systems regarding meritocracy and 
making attributions to discrimination; and (2) the influence of 
widespread views regarding the nature and commonality of 
discrimination on how potentially discriminatory events are 
perceived. As detailed below, psychologists have found consid-
erable support for the conclusion that each of these factors 
plays a substantial role in influencing (and minimizing) the ex-
tent to which individual observers make attributions to  
discrimination.97 
 
phobic Murder, 46 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 93, 103–04 (2002) (in survey of arti-
cles discussing the Matthew Shepard murder finding that “[a]rticles that were 
more likely to attribute homosexuality to controllable causes also were coded 
as less likely to have favorable attitudes towards homosexuals or antigay hate 
crime legislation”). 
 97. Victims of discrimination, while subject to some extent to the same 
psychological constraints described herein, are also subject to a much more 
complicated array of motivational and cognitive influences on their willingness 
to make attributions to discrimination. See, e.g., Major et al., supra note 51, at 
270–72, 279–86 (summarizing research regarding perceptions and reporting of 
discrimination by victims); Brenda Major & Cheryl R. Kaiser, Perceiving and 
Claiming Discrimination, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES, supra note 49, at 285, 286–89, 291–92 
(same); J. Nicole Shelton & Rebecca E. Stewart, Confronting Perpetrators of 
Prejudice: The Inhibitory Effects of Social Costs, 28 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 215, 
220–21 (2004) (describing how perceived personal costs can influence the like-
lihood of confronting discrimination); see also Cheryl R. Kaiser, Dominant Ide-
ology Threat & the Interpersonal Consequences of Attributions to Discrimina-
tion, in STIGMA & GROUP INEQUALITY: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 
45, 47–50 (Shana Levin & Colette van Laar, eds. 2006) [hereinafter Kaiser, 
Dominant Ideology Threat] (describing research showing that complaining of 
discrimination leads to increased derogation of victims of discrimination, even 
where there is strong corroborative evidence of discrimination). Because the 
factors affecting victims’ attributions (insofar as those factors are unique to 
victims) are not relevant to the central issue here (when judges and jurors are 
willing to make attributions to discrimination), they are not discussed in this 
Article. In addition, I have omitted a discussion of a few factors that have been 
shown to influence perceptions of discrimination, but which are impossible to 
interpret in terms of their practical significance for judge and juror decision-
making. See, e.g., Gretchen B. Sechrist et al., Mood as Information in Making 
Attributions to Discrimination, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 524, 
528–29 (2003) (finding mood appears to moderate both observers’ and victims’ 
tendency to make attributions to discrimination, with attributions to discrimi-
nation being less likely when mood is elevated than when it is depressed). 
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1. Meritocracy Beliefs and Attributions to Discrimination 
It is well-established that the overwhelming majority of 
Americans—of all groups and races—subscribe to some extent 
to meritocracy beliefs.98 Indeed, meritocracy beliefs are so wide-
spread in the United States that they are frequently referred to 
as the dominant or national American ideology.99 Meritocracy 
beliefs can take a variety of forms, but typically center around 
a cluster of related beliefs that: (1) hard work gets you ahead in 
life; (2) advancement is possible for all individuals in American 
society; and (3) people usually get what they deserve based on 
their effort and skill.100 
 
 98. See, e.g., JAMES R. KLUEGEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT INE-
QUALITY: AMERICANS’ VIEWS OF WHAT IS AND WHAT OUGHT TO BE 44, 49, 287–
89 (1986) (documenting American meritocracy beliefs and referring to such be-
liefs as the “dominant ideology” in America); John T. Jost et al., Social Ine-
quality and the Reduction of Ideological Dissonance on Behalf of the System: 
Evidence of Enhanced System Justification Among the Disadvantaged, 33 
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 13, 26 (2003) (finding that all groups surveyed, includ-
ing minority groups, “endorsed meritocratic ideology to a relatively strong ex-
tent” and describing survey results); Sheri R. Levy et al., Hurricane Katrina’s 
Impact on African Americans’ and European Americans Endorsement of the 
Protestant Work Ethic, 6 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB. POL’Y 75, 75–76 (2006) 
(noting that the Protestant Work Ethic—a type of meritocracy belief—“is wide-
ly endorsed by Americans of all ages and backgrounds, and thought to be a 
stable, deeply ingrained cultural belief ”); Brenda Major & Toni Schmader, Le-
gitimacy and the Construal of Social Disadvantage, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE, AND INTER-
GROUP RELATIONS 176, 182 (John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001) (describ-
ing meritocracy beliefs as the “dominant ideology” in the United States and 
noting that such beliefs are widely ascribed to even by those who are disad-
vantaged in society). The literature in this area has used a variety of terms 
and constructs to address this issue, including “Belief in a Just World” (BJW) 
and “Protestant Work Ethic” (PWE). For linguistic and analytical ease, I use 
here the single term “meritocracy beliefs” to describe these various constructs, 
with the caveat that using that single term somewhat simplifies the experi-
mental picture. 
 99. See e.g., KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 98, at 23, 287–89; see also Ma-
jor & Schmader, supra note 98, at 182; cf. Lindsay E. Rankin et al., System 
Justification and the Meaning of Life: Are the Existential Benefits of Ideology 
Distributed Unequally Across Racial Groups?, 22 SOC. JUST. RES. 312, 324–26 
(2009) (finding that subscribing to meritocracy beliefs has significant positive 
psychological effects, but that these effects are lesser—and sometimes even 
reversed—in racial minorities). 
 100. See, e.g., KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 98, at 23, 44; Jost et al., supra 
note 98, at 25–26; Levy et al., supra note 98, at 75–76; Major & Schmader, su-
pra note 98, at 182; see also Eric Luis Uhlmann et al., American Moral 
Exceptionalism, in SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF IDEOLOGY AND SYS-
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Given the overwhelming pervasiveness of meritocracy be-
liefs in American society, it would be surprising if these beliefs 
did not have some effect on Americans’ perceptions of events in 
the world around them. And indeed, the psychological litera-
ture (led by a vein of research called System Justification The-
ory or SJT) has made clear that world-view beliefs like meri-
tocracy can have a profound effect on people’s interpretations of 
particular events, and the extent to which they perceive them 
as unfair or justified.101 Psychology scholars have demonstrated, 
for example, that people often develop meritocracy-consistent 
explanations for why a particular group is more successful than 
another (often by blaming or negatively stereotyping the rela-
tively unsuccessful group).102 Similarly, studies have shown 
that people often ignore relevant data that suggest that merito-
cratic principles are being violated (including by—at times—
misremembering nonmeritocratic explanations as being more 
legitimate than they in fact were).103 
 
TEM JUSTIFICATION 27, 32–37 (John T. Jost et al. eds., 2009) (describing the 
origins and contemporary manifestations of American meritocracy beliefs). 
 101. SJT scholars’ principal premise is that people are psychologically mo-
tivated to defend the status quo. As a byproduct of this hypothesis they have 
argued that meritocracy beliefs (and other similar constructs) are often devel-
oped in order to justify current inequalities. These beliefs, in turn, play a sub-
stantial role in the process whereby individuals perceive a particular set of 
events as fair and justified. See, e.g., John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, Ante-
cedents and Consequences of System-Justifying Ideologies, 14 CURRENT DI-
RECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 260, 262–63 (2005). For a good general overview of 
the SJT literature and findings, see generally Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, Sys-
tem Justification Theory and Research: Implications for Law, Legal Advocacy, 
and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119 (2006); John T. Jost et al., A Decade 
of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Un-
conscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 881 (2004).  
 102. For example, SJT scholars have found that depending on which of two 
groups is experimentally manipulated to be characterized as more successful, 
people will characterize the “successful” group as more intelligent, hard work-
ing, etc., and the less “successful” group as less intelligent, lazier, etc. See, e.g., 
Blasi & Jost, supra note 101, at 1134–35; John T. Jost & Diana Burgess, Atti-
tudinal Ambivalence and the Conflict Between Group and System Justification 
Motives in Low Status Groups, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 293, 
297–300 (2000). This result holds even where people are themselves a part of 
the experimentally designated “unsuccessful” group, showing the ability of 
“unsuccessful” or subordinated groups to internalize the assumption that mer-
itocracy-based explanations (rather than discrimination or simple unfairness) 
are responsible. Blasi & Jost, supra note 101, at 1134–35; Jost & Burgess, su-
pra, at 297–300. 
 103. For example, SJT scholars have shown that people misremember a 
meritocracy-violating explanation as more legitimate or meritocratic than it 
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All this has led scholars of the perception of discrimination 
to hypothesize that one of the factors leading to resistance to 
making attributions to discrimination may be the psychological 
tension between meritocracy beliefs and recognizing particular 
events as discrimination.104 For obvious reasons, discrimina-
tion—particularly if it is perceived to be common or systemat-
ic—calls into question the veracity of meritocratic belief sys-
tems.105 Simply put, if minorities, women, and other 
disadvantaged groups are regularly denied opportunities on the 
basis of reasons other than their effort and abilities, then we do 
not live in a meritocracy. Moreover, unlike isolated and indi-
vidualistic meritocracy-violating events (such as a particular 
person being an unfair and arbitrary distributor of rewards), 
discrimination has the potential to pose a much more substan-
tial challenge to meritocratic beliefs, insofar as it suggests a 
systematic disadvantaging of particular classes of individu-
 
actually was at a rate of roughly 33%. See Elizabeth L. Haines & John T. Jost, 
Placating the Powerless: Effects of Legitimate and Illegitimate Explanation on 
Affect, Memory, and Stereotyping, 13 SOC. JUST. RES. 219, 231 (2000). In con-
trast, people given a meritocracy-affirming explanation misremembered get-
ting a meritocracy-violating explanation at a rate of only 3%. Id. 
 104. See, e.g., Carolyn L. Hafer & Becky L. Choma, Belief in a Just World, 
Perceived Fairness, and Justification of the Status Quo, in SOCIAL AND PSY-
CHOLOGICAL BASES OF IDEOLOGY AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION, supra note 100, 
at 107, 108–13; Cheryl R. Kaiser & Brenda Major, A Social Psychological Per-
spective on Perceiving and Reporting Discrimination, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
801, 806–12 (2006); Sharon K. McCoy & Brenda Major, Priming Meritocracy 
and the Psychological Justification of Inequality, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 341, 341–42 (2007); Laurie T. O’Brien et al., Understanding White 
Americans’ Perceptions of Racism in Hurricane Katrina-Related Events, 12 
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 431, 432–33 (2009). It may also be 
that meritocracy beliefs directly lead to fewer attributions to discrimination 
because they cause people to be more likely to perceive events as based on 
merit, rather than unfair outcomes. See, e.g., Brenda Major et al., Perceived 
Discrimination as Worldview Threat or Worldview Confirmation: Implications 
for Self-Esteem, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1068, 1081 (2007) [here-
inafter Major et al., Perceived Discrimination as Worldview Threat]; Brenda 
Major et al., Perceiving Personal Discrimination: The Role of Group Status and 
Legitimating Ideology, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 269, 270–71 
(2002) [hereinafter Major et al., Perceiving Personal Discrimination]. 
 105. O’Brien et al., supra note 104, at 432; see also Kaiser, Dominant Ideol-
ogy Threat, supra note 97, at 53–54; Cheryl R. Kaiser et al., Post-Hurricane 
Katrina Racialized Explanations as a System Threat: Implications for Whites’ 
and Blacks’ Racial Attitudes, 21 SOC. JUST. RES. 192, 193–94 (2008) [hereinaf-
ter Kaiser et al., Post-Hurricane Katrina]. 
 2012] LIMITS OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 1307 
 
als.106 Thus, there are significant reasons to believe that accusa-
tions of discrimination should trigger the types of responses 
(such as denial and victim blame) that have been well-
documented in the context of other threats to meritocratic prin-
ciples, and that these responses will translate into fewer at-
tributions to discrimination.107 
Considerable experimental support has been gathered for 
this theoretical perspective over the last decade. Most striking-
ly, a series of studies have directly tested the theory that meri-
tocratic beliefs are inversely related to attributions to discrimi-
nation, and have found that such beliefs do in fact lead people 
to make significantly fewer attributions to discrimination.108 
While some of these studies have employed correlational meth-
ods that are causally hard to interpret (showing only that those 
with higher meritocracy beliefs make fewer attributions to dis-
crimination), others have employed much more nuanced psy-
chological methods to tease out the causal influence of meritoc-
racy beliefs. For example, a number of scholars have 
demonstrated that even when people are primed109 subcon-
 
 106. Kaiser et al., Post-Hurricane Katrina, supra note 105, at 193–94; 
Cheryl R. Kaiser et al., Why Are Attributions to Discrimination Interpersonally 
Costly? A Test of System- and Group-Justifying Motivations, 32 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1523, 1528 (2006) [hereinafter Kaiser et al., Why Are 
Attributions to Discrimination Costly]. 
 107. See, e.g., Hafer & Choma, supra note 104, at 108–13; Kaiser & Major, 
supra note 104, at 808–12; O’Brien et al., supra note 104, at 432–33; see also 
Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 55–56; Kaiser et al., Why 
Are Attributions to Discrimination Costly, supra note 106, at 1524. 
 108. See, e.g., Hafer & Choma, supra note 104; Kaiser & Major, supra note 
104, at 808–12; Major & Schmader, supra note 98, at 185–89; Major et al., 
Perceiving Personal Discrimination, supra note 104, at 275, 278, 281; McCoy & 
Major, supra note 104, at 346, 350–51; see also Isaac M. Lipkus & Ilene C. 
Siegler, The Belief in a Just World and Perceptions of Discrimination, 127 J. 
PSYCHOL. 465, 473 (1993) (finding that higher scores on the “Belief in a Just 
World” scale correlated with lower perceptions of individual discrimination). 
Interestingly, research has shown that members of high status groups (such 
as white men) who are rejected in favor of a minority group member are more 
likely to believe they have been subject to discrimination where they have high 
meritocracy beliefs. See, e.g., Major et al., Perceiving Personal Discrimination, 
supra note 104, at 275, 278, 281. This result makes sense, as strong meritoc-
racy beliefs may lead individuals to believe that minority groups are genuinely 
inferior, and thus that outcomes favoring such groups must not be based on 
merit principles.  
 109. For those not familiar with priming, it is a technique often used in the 
psychological literature to subconsciously activate a particular psychological 
construct, which inter alia allows a more direct evaluation of its causal effects.  
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sciously to think about meritocratic ideals, they make fewer at-
tributions to discrimination than a control group.110 Thus, even 
a task as simple as unscrambling words to form meritocracy-
related sentences111 in advance of making assessments of 
whether discrimination has occurred causes people to make 
significantly fewer attributions to discrimination.112 
Further support for the hypothesized causal influence of a 
conflict between meritocracy beliefs and attributions to discrim-
ination has come from an array of studies that have looked at 
the extent to which observers display classic psychological 
threat response signs (e.g., signs of agitation or anxiety) when 
exposed to allegations of discrimination.113 In effect, psychology 
scholars have tested the theory that attributions to discrimina-
tion are perceived as a threat to many individuals’ core beliefs 
by examining the existence of well-known manifestations of 
psychological threat conditions—such as negative feelings (in-
cluding anxiety and distress), victim blame, and “in-group”114 
bolstering—upon exposure to accusations of discrimination.115 
 
 110. See, e.g., Kaiser & Major, supra note 104, at 811; McCoy & Major, su-
pra note 104, at 346.  
 111. For example, the words presented to a subject might be “Life Work 
Gets Hard You in Ahead,” which unscrambles to “Hard Work Gets You Ahead 
in Life.” 
 112. See, e.g., Kaiser & Major, supra note 104, at 811; McCoy & Major, su-
pra note 104, at 346. 
 113. See infra notes 114, 117–26 and accompanying text. For additional 
studies with results supportive of the meritocracy-threat hypothesis, see, for 
example, Cheryl R. Kaiser & Jennifer S. Pratt-Hyatt, Distributing Prejudice 
Unequally: Do Whites Direct Their Prejudice Towards Strongly Identified Mi-
norities?, 96 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 432, 442 (2009) (showing that 
strongly identified racial minorities are derogated more by individuals who 
strongly endorse meritocracy beliefs, apparently because they are assumed to 
lack shared beliefs in meritocracy ideals); Levy et al., supra note 98, at 79, 81 
(showing that although African Americans’ endorsement of meritocracy beliefs 
declined in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, apparently partially in response to 
perceptions of discrimination, they rebounded relatively quickly). There is also 
an interesting body of research from the affirmative action context that is 
supportive of the meritocracy-threat hypothesis. See, e.g., Faye J. Crosby et 
al., Understanding Affirmative Action, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 585, 599–600 
(2006); Donna M. Garcia et al., Opposition to Redistributive Employment Poli-
cies for Women: The Role of Policy Experience and Group Interest, 44 BRIT. J. 
OF SOC. PSYCHOL. 583, 595–96 (2005). 
 114. The term “in-group” is used in psychology and sociology to refer to so-
cial groups that one identifies with as a member. The term “out-group” is used 
to refer to groups that one does not belong to and does not identify with.  
 115. See infra notes 117–26 and accompanying text. 
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As set forth below, the results have been striking—attributions 
to discrimination do in fact trigger psychological threat re-
sponses—particularly among those who are high endorsers of 
meritocracy beliefs or who have been experimentally primed 
with such beliefs.116  
Among the most striking findings in this area are that 
meritocracy beliefs lead to increased victim blame and deroga-
tion in the discrimination context, both phenomena that are 
frequently observed when someone experiences a psychological 
“threat.”117 Indeed, Cheryl Kaiser and her colleagues have 
demonstrated that people routinely ascribe negative qualities 
to individuals who attribute their failure to discrimination (as 
compared to some other cause), even in circumstances where 
discrimination appears to be a virtual certainty.118 These re-
sults, moreover, have been found to be moderated by meritocra-
cy beliefs—those with high meritocracy beliefs are significantly 
more likely to engage in victim blame than those with low mer-
itocracy beliefs.119 Similarly, scholars have found that subtle 
priming with meritocracy constructs (via a word scramble or 
other method) leads to increased endorsement of negative ste-
reotypes regarding African Americans and other groups that 
have traditionally been subjected to discrimination.120 
 
 116. See infra notes 117–26 and accompanying text. 
 117. See infra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. See generally Aaron C. 
Kay et al., Victim Derogation and Victim Enhancement as Alternate Routes to 
System Justification, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 240 (2005) (describing the role of vic-
tim derogation in managing responses to psychological threats). 
 118. See, e.g., Donna M. Garcia et al., Perceivers’ Responses to In-Group 
and Out-Group Members Who Blame a Negative Outcome on Discrimination, 
31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 769, 774–77 (2005); Kaiser & Major, 
supra note 104, at 818–19; Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. Miller, Derogating the 
Victim: The Interpersonal Consequences of Blaming Events on Discrimination, 
6 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 227, 233–36 (2003); Kaiser, Domi-
nant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 47–50; Cheryl R. Kaiser & Carol T. 
Miller, Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making Attributions to Discrim-
ination, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 254, 258, 261–62 (2001) 
[hereinafter Kaiser & Miller, Stop Complaining]. 
 119. See, e.g., Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 56–57; 
Kaiser et al., Why Are Attributions to Discrimination Costly, supra note 106, at 
1527, 1531; Major et al., Perceived Discrimination as Worldview Threat, supra 
note 104, at 1076. 
 120. See, e.g., Irwin Katz & R. Glen Hass, Racial Ambivalence and Ameri-
can Value Conflict: Correlational and Priming Studies of Dual Cognitive 
Structures, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 893, 899–902 (1988); McCoy 
& Major, supra note 104, at 349–50.  
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In the converse of this victim-blame phenomenon, scholars 
have found that attributions to discrimination against out-
group members lead to a defensive reaction, causing people to 
more strongly embrace their own in-group.121 Thus, for example, 
whites who were shown a video attributing the problems in the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina to discrimination expressed 
significantly more positive feelings towards other whites than a 
group shown a video attributing Katrina’s problems to simple 
incompetence.122 Relatedly, scholars have found that receiving 
an affirmation treatment, designed to lessen anxieties and in-
crease self-esteem, significantly increases white observers’ will-
ingness to describe a particular set of facts as discrimination.123 
Both of these findings suggest that defensive reactions may 
play some role in majority group resistance to making attribu-
tions to discrimination, a conclusion that is buttressed by re-
search showing that individuals are much less likely to charac-
terize behaviors as discriminatory in circumstances that might 
be self-implicating (i.e., where they themselves have engaged in 
similar behaviors).124 
A final key piece of evidence that attributions to discrimi-
nation are perceived as psychologically threatening to meritoc-
racy beliefs comes from experiments evaluating the emotional 
response of observers who are exposed to a minority group 
member making an attribution to discrimination. Along a sig-
nificant array of affect-related criteria—including anxiousness, 
nervousness, and distress—the extent of endorsement of meri-
tocracy beliefs has been found to moderate the extent of psycho-
logical discomfort or distress that observers experience when 
faced with an attribution to discrimination (or, put another 
way, those who are higher endorsers of meritocracy beliefs ex-
perience significantly greater psychological distress when faced 
with attributions to discrimination).125 Moreover, priming stud-
ies have demonstrated that even where a subject is simply 
 
 121. See supra note 118. 
 122. Kaiser et al., Post-Hurricane Katrina, supra note 105, at 199 tbl.1. 
 123. See, e.g., Glenn Adams et al., The Effect of Self-Affirmation on Percep-
tion of Racism, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 616, 621–22 (2006).  
 124. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Lay Theories About 
White Racists: What Constitutes Racism (and What Doesn’t), 9 GROUP PRO-
CESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 117, 133 (2006). 
 125. See, e.g., Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 54–55; 
Kaiser et al., Why Are Attributions to Discrimination Costly, supra note 106, at 
1533–34.  
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primed with meritocracy beliefs, and is not a fortiori a strong 
endorser of such beliefs, they experience significantly greater 
psychological distress when faced with accusations of discrimi-
nation than their nonprimed counterparts.126 
There is, then, substantial support for the conclusion that 
attributions to discrimination are in tension with meritocracy 
beliefs, and that this dynamic contributes to many people’s re-
luctance to make robust attributions to discrimination. In the 
following Section, I turn to a discussion of how cognitive factors 
influence attributions to discrimination. 
2. The Influence of Cognitive Factors on Attributions to 
Discrimination127 
Although the precise theories differ in their terminology 
and specifics, it is well-established in the field of psychology 
that the human process of making judgments is shortcut-laden, 
and is not comprehensively rational in its analysis of potential-
ly relevant information.128 We simply do not have the cognitive 
 
 126. See, e.g., Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 54–55; 
Kaiser et al., Why Are Attributions to Discrimination Costly, supra note 106, at 
1534. 
 127. I have omitted here a discussion of one of the cognitive factors that 
undoubtedly plays a large role in people’s failure to detect discrimination in 
individual circumstances prior to litigation. Specifically, psychology scholars 
have found very substantial evidence to support the conclusion that people 
have much greater difficulties discerning discrimination in disorganized in-
formation than in information that provides systematic comparisons. Thus, 
people are much less likely to make attributions to discrimination where they 
are presented with information in a format that does not make it easy to com-
pare outcomes across groups (for example, information presented in the disor-
dered multi-page form it would likely be maintained in an employers’ files, as 
opposed to in a compiled chart). See, e.g., Faye J. Crosby & Alison M. Konrad, 
Affirmative Action in Employment, 10 DIVERSITY FACTOR 3, 5 (2002); Faye 
Crosby et al., Cognitive Biases in the Perception of Discrimination: The Im-
portance of Format, 14 SEX ROLES 637, 642, 644–46 (1986); see also Christel 
G. Rutte, Organization of Information and the Detection of Gender Discrimina-
tion, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. 226, 229–30 (1994). Given that the prelitigation presen-
tation of information is likely to be highly unorganized (if indeed comparator 
information is even available), this phenomenon undoubtedly plays a signifi-
cant role in causing much discrimination to go undetected in our society. I 
have omitted a full discussion of this phenomenon here, as it is difficult to 
know what if any causal valence it has in relation to actual litigation out-
comes, without having a better understanding of whether plaintiffs’ attorneys 
do or do not typically do a good job of obtaining and organizing information as 
part of the litigation process.  
 128. For an excellent and accessible overview of many of the pertinent con-
cepts, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive 
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capacity to undergo a full evaluation of all information we have 
ever received de novo each time we are presented with a new 
judgment-demanding situation.129 One feature of this necessary 
cognitive conservativeness is that our existing understandings 
of the world have a substantial influence on how we interpret in-
coming information, particularly in ambiguous circumstances.130 
There are a number of specific ways that established un-
derstandings can impact the interpretation of information in a 
particular factual scenario. Among the most well-documented is 
the tendency for people to rely on their existing mental proto-
types as a basis for making judgments in a new factual con-
text.131 In essence, people will compare incoming data against 
their existing cognitive template to see if they are a match—if 
there are too many dissimilarities, that template will be reject-
ed as a potential explanation, and the search for another will 
begin.132 For example, a person may assess whether or not a 
particular object is a table by comparing it to his or her mental 
template of “table”: legs, flat surface, etc. More complexly, a 
person may make initial judgments about whether a person is 
an authority figure by accessing his or her mental template for 
“authority figure”; a template that may include tone of voice, 
posture, and for some people, race and sex. The process of mak-
ing judgments thus becomes one of comparing salient features 
of an existing template and the situation currently demanding 
interpretation, and judging the extent of similarity.133 
A similar, but distinct, phenomenon has been found in 
people’s reliance on what is referred to in the psychology field 
as “cognitive accessibility” as an indicator of the likelihood that 
a particular causal explanation is correct. For all of us, differ-
ing explanations for particular outcomes are more or less “cog-
nitively accessible,” i.e., more or less likely to come to mind 
when faced with a particular situation.134 This depends on a 
 
Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1188–90, 1199–1211 (1995).  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. David E. Rumelhart, Schemata and the Cognitive System, in 1 HAND-
BOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 161, 163, 166 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K. 
Srull eds., 1984). 
 132. Id. at 166–71.  
 133. Id. 
 134. See, e.g., JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 153–55 (4th ed. 
2008).  
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host of factors, including the extent to which particular expla-
nations are generally perceived to be common occurrences (e.g., 
a general belief that discrimination is relatively common) or 
have been recently accessed mentally (e.g., a recent experience 
with a set of events that were perceived as discriminatory).135 
Accessibility is in turn interpreted by most people as an indica-
tor of the actual likelihood that the explanation is correct, such 
that cognitively accessible explanations are perceived to be 
more likely to be correct, whereas cognitively inaccessible ex-
planations are perceived as less likely to be correct.136  
Both of these well-established cognitive phenomena have 
obvious potential implications for the perception of discrimina-
tion. To the extent that most people have preexisting cognitive 
prototypes for what constitutes “discrimination,” cognitive psy-
chology research suggests that these prototypes should have a 
substantial influence on the extent to which particular events 
are judged to be discrimination. Similarly, research on cogni-
tive accessibility suggests that the extent to which discrimina-
tion is a more (or less) cognitively accessible explanation for 
negative outcomes than other potential causes (such as a lack 
of effort or ability on the part of the victim) may have a signifi-
cant impact on whether people make judgments of discrimina-
tion in particular contexts. 
The first of these concepts—the notion that cognitive proto-
types play a role in how people make judgments of discrimina-
tion—is by now well-accepted among scholars of the perception 
of discrimination. Across a wide variety of contexts, psychology 
scholars have demonstrated that people do in fact have cogni-
tive templates of what constitutes discrimination (although 
these templates may vary from person to person), and that the-
se templates profoundly influence the interpretation of a par-
ticular set of events as discriminatory or nondiscriminatory.137 
Thus, if significant features of an evaluator’s cognitive proto-
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See, e.g., Major & Sawyer, supra note 7, at 94–98; Laurie T. O’Brien et 
al., How Status and Stereotypes Impact Attributions to Discrimination: The 
Stereotype-Asymmetry Hypothesis, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 405, 405–06 
(2008); O’Brien et al., supra note 104, at 439; see also Barrett & Swim, supra 
note 92 (providing an excellent overview of the ways in which cognitive factors 
may influence attributions to discrimination); infra notes 139–43 and accom-
panying text.  
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type of discrimination are missing or incongruent in the factual 
scenario presented to them, the evaluator generally will not 
make attributions to discrimination.138 
So what are the features of most people’s cognitive tem-
plates of discrimination? Although any number of cognitive 
prototypes undoubtedly exist across the population, the cogni-
tive prototype that appears to be commonly applied by most 
people is a relatively narrow one of fairly explicit classic dis-
parate treatment.139 Thus, psychologists have found, for exam-
ple, that: 
 People’s cognitive prototype of discrimination, and hence 
their willingness to make attributions to discrimination, 
is dependent on the existence of very strong and explicit 
evidence of invidious intent. Thus, even where victims 
are significantly harmed, if there is no intent (or even 
ambiguous intent) people are very reluctant to make at-
tributions to discrimination.140 
 People generally also consider harm to be a prototypical 
element of discrimination, and are far less likely to make 
attributions to discrimination in circumstances where 
there is ambiguous harm to the victim (e.g., “benevolent 
sexism”) or in which the actor’s intentions are unambig-
uously invidious but there is no obvious tangible harm.141 
 Stereotypical perpetrator/victim dyads feature promi-
nently in many people’s prototypes of discrimination, 
such that unequal treatment perpetrated by a member of 
the same minority group, or by a minority group member 
 
 138. See, e.g., Major & Sawyer, supra note 7, at 94–98; see also infra notes 
138–43 and accompanying text. 
 139. See, e.g., O’Brien et al., supra note 104, at 437; Sommers & Norton, 
supra note 124, at 132. 
 140. See, e.g., Major & Sawyer, supra note 7, at 94, 98; Swim et al., Judg-
ments of Prejudice, supra note 82, at 958–59; see also Foster & Dion, supra 
note 88 (showing that individuals generally did not perceive discrimination in 
a disparate impact context); Kappen & Branscombe, supra note 89, at 300, 302 
(same). 
 141. See, e.g., Major & Sawyer, supra note 7, at 94, 98; Swim et al., Judg-
ments of Prejudice, supra note 82, at 951; see also Swim et al., Judgments of 
Sexism, supra note 92, at 408–10; Barrett & Swim, supra note 92, at 22. 
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against a majority group member, is generally less likely 
to be attributed to discrimination.142 
 The prototype of a victim of discrimination is one who 
does not have control over his or her stigmatized status, 
such that victims who are perceived as having control 
are significantly less likely to be found to have been sub-
jected to discrimination.143 
There is also developing (albeit less fully matured) evi-
dence for the conclusion that the cognitive accessibility of dis-
crimination as compared to other explanations also plays a role 
in judgments of discrimination. Specifically, several scholars 
have found that people’s background understandings of how 
common or rare discrimination is significantly influences 
whether or not they make attributions to discrimination in par-
ticular factual contexts (with those who have higher preexisting 
expectancies of the incidence of discrimination being more like-
ly to find discrimination in any given context).144 This finding is 
consistent with the conclusion that the explanation of discrimi-
nation is relatively cognitively accessible for those who believe 
discrimination to be relatively widespread, and that, converse-
ly, discrimination is relatively cognitively inaccessible for those 
who believe discrimination to be rare.145 Whether or not one 
subscribes to a cognitive accessibility interpretation, it is clear 
that background understandings of the commonality of discrim-
 
 142. See, e.g., Avery et al., supra note 93, at 236; Inman & Baron, supra 
note 55, at 732; Krumm & Corning, supra note 93, at 1110–11 (2008); Major & 
Sawyer, supra note 7, at 94, 98. 
 143. See, e.g., Blaine & Williams, supra note 95, at 83; Crocker et al., supra 
note 95, at 66; Major et al., supra note 51, at 288–89; Major & Sawyer, supra 
note 7, at 98; see also sources cited supra notes 95–96.  
 144. See, e.g., Avery et al., supra note 93, at 237; Barrett & Swim, supra 
note 92, at 24; James D. Johnson et al., Predicting Perceived Racism and Ac-
ceptance of Negative Behavioral Intergroup Responses: Validating the JLS in a 
College and Community Sample of Blacks, 40 PERSONALITY & INDIV. DIFFER-
ENCES 421, 427 (2006); Major & Sawyer, supra note 7, at 96–97; see also Jon 
Hurwitz & Mark Peffley, Explaining the Great Racial Divide: Perceptions of 
Fairness in the U.S. Criminal Justice System, 67 J. POL. 762, 764–65 (2005) 
(showing that racial divides in the perceived fairness of the criminal justice 
system have a large impact on the interpretation of ambiguously discriminato-
ry incidents). 
 145. For example, it is reasonable to assume that discrimination will be a 
cognitively more accessible explanation for negative outcomes if discrimina-
tion is perceived as a common phenomenon in today’s society.  
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ination significantly influence attributions to discrimination in 
individual circumstances.146 
So do most people believe discrimination to be relatively 
rare or common? The answer varies significantly across groups, 
with majority group members (i.e., white males) being highly 
likely to subscribe to a “discrimination is rare” view.147 African 
Americans are more likely to subscribe to a “discrimination is 
common” view, as are (to a somewhat lesser extent) members of 
other historically disadvantaged groups (such as women and 
people with disabilities).148 Thus, there are reasons to believe 
that different groups may respond differently to particular fac-
tual scenarios when asked to assess whether or not discrimina-
tion has occurred (a phenomenon that has considerable empiri-
cal support), and that the groups that predominate on the 
federal judiciary are among the least likely to make attribu-
tions to discrimination.149 
Interestingly, both of the foregoing cognitive phenomena 
are a fortiori content-neutral vis-à-vis whether or not they are 
likely to be helpful or harmful to discrimination claimants. One 
can envision, for example, reliance on cognitive prototypes be-
ing helpful to discrimination claimants if the prevailing proto-
type of discrimination was one that embraced (as so many legal 
scholars do) anti-subordination principles, or presumed that 
 
 146. See sources cited supra note 141. 
 147. See, e.g., KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 98, at 49, 63, 185–200; Hur-
witz & Peffley, supra note 144, at 763; O’Brien et al., supra note 104, at 441; 
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of Cali-
fornia Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts Re-
veals Low Success Rate for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 
561–62 (2003); Robinson, supra note 6, at 1107–17. 
 148. See, e.g., KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 98, at 190, 200; Hurwitz & 
Peffley, supra note 144, at 763; Robinson, supra note 6, at 1107–17; see also 
Avery et al., supra note 93, at 237. 
 149. A number of studies have found that judges of different groups re-
spond differently in making assessments of discrimination, and that white 
male judges are less likely to make such attributions as compared to other 
groups. See, e.g., Pat K. Chew, Judges’ Gender and Employment Discrimina-
tion Cases: Emerging Evidence-Based Empirical Conclusions, 14 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 359, 367–71 (2011); Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of 
the Colorblind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1161 (2009); Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Mat-
ter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 
YALE L.J. 1759, 1787 (2005); Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examin-
ing Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 313, 343–44 (2012).  
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any individual who has fulfilled the McDonnell Douglas re-
quirements has proven discrimination. Similarly, if popular 
opinion (particularly of those on the bench) widely subscribed 
to the view that discrimination remains common in our society, 
the relative cognitive accessibility of discrimination as a poten-
tial causal explanation would undoubtedly favor plaintiffs. 
So what explains the content of widely held prototypes and 
beliefs about discrimination? No doubt the media, family, col-
leagues, and other social networks play a significant role. Psy-
chologists have also developed some support for the conclusion, 
however, that meritocracy beliefs (discussed above for their in-
fluence on the frequency with which people make attributions 
to discrimination in individualized circumstances) also play a 
role in the broader views of discrimination that people adopt.150 
The most interesting work in this area has been performed by 
Laurie O’Brien, who has shown that meritocracy beliefs signifi-
cantly influence the extent to which people adopt narrow, dis-
parate treatment models of discrimination (people are much 
more likely to do so where they are high endorsers of meritoc-
racy beliefs) as well as the extent to which people believe dis-
crimination is generally widespread (people are more likely to 
believe discrimination is rare if they are high endorsers of mer-
itocracy beliefs).151 While work in this area is still in the devel-
opmental stages and many questions remain unanswered, ex-
isting research suggests that the various causal factors that 
scholars have observed may have significant interrelationships 
that have yet to be fully explored.152 
  * * *   
In sum, the psychological literature on the perception of 
discrimination shows an across-the-board tendency for people 
to decline to make attributions to discrimination; a tendency 
that is further accentuated outside of the context of explicit 
traditional disparate treatment. Psychological scholars have 
 
 150. See, e.g., Lipkus & Siegler, supra note 108, at 470; O’Brien et al., su-
pra note 104, at 437–39; see also Glenn Adams et al., Perceptions of Racism in 
Hurricane Katrina: A Liberation Psychology Analysis, 6 ANALYSES SOC. IS-
SUES & PUB. POL’Y 215, 219–20, 221–26 (2006) (discussing an array of factors 
that may influence prototypes and beliefs about discrimination). 
 151. See, e.g., O’Brien et al., supra note 104, at 437–39; see also Lipkus & 
Siegler, supra note 108, at 470.  
 152. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text. 
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found, moreover, considerable experimental support for the 
conclusion that this phenomenon is driven by a tension be-
tween commonly held beliefs about discrimination and meritoc-
racy and the recognition of discrimination claims. In the follow-
ing Part, I turn to a discussion of the reasons why these 
phenomena provide a likely explanation for the pervasive diffi-
culties that discrimination litigants face in the courts. 
III.  APPLYING THE FINDINGS OF PSYCHOLOGY 
SCHOLARS TO REAL-WORLD DISCRIMINATION 
OUTCOMES   
As discussed in Part I, many existing theories for why dis-
crimination litigants face adverse outcomes do not fit well with 
the actual experiences of discrimination litigants.153 So how do 
the findings of psychology scholars (discussed in Part II) fare? 
A side-by-side comparison of the findings of psychology scholars 
and the experiences of discrimination litigants suggests that 
extensive and striking overlaps exist between the two arenas.154 
Indeed, psychology scholars have repeatedly documented phe-
nomena in lay subjects that closely replicate the full range of 
experiences of discrimination litigants, even down to the level 
of relative doctrinal minutiae.155  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 153. See supra notes 34–50 and accompanying text. 
 154. See infra Table 1. 
 155. Id. 
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Table 1 
Summary: Psychology Studies and Anti-Discrimination Literature 
Phenomenon Observed Psychology Study Anti-Discrimination 
Literature / Case Law 
Attributions to discrim-
ination rare, even in 
cases of classic dispar-
ate treatment.  
See sources cited supra 
notes 58–82 and ac-
companying text. 
See sources cited supra 
notes 37, 41–42 and 
accompanying text.  
Attributions to discrim-
ination even less likely 
where no clear indicia of 
traditional invidious 
intent. 
Swim et al. (2003); Fos-
ter & Dion (2004); 
Kappen & Branscombe 
(2001) 
Bagenstos (2006); Bell 
(1985); Siegel (1997); 
Flagg (1993) 
Differential treatment 
based on statuses that 
are perceived of as con-
trollable (e.g., sexual 
orientation, obesity) un-
likely to be perceived as 
discriminatory. 
 
 
 
Major & Sawyer 
(2009); Major (2002); 
Crocker (1993); Blaine 
& Williams (2004); 
Weiner (1988); Quist & 
Weigand (2003); 
Haider-Markel & 
Joslyn (2008) 
YOSHINO (2006); 
Yoshino (2002); Halley 
(1994) 
Fact patterns that devi-
ate from stereotypical 
discrimination “stories” 
(e.g., minority-on-
minority discrimination, 
discrimination in which 
the same actor hires 
and fires an employee) 
less likely to be per-
ceived as discrimina-
tion. 
Inman & Baron (1996); 
Krumm & Corning 
(2008); Major & Saw-
yer (2009); Avery et al. 
(2008) 
Oncale v. Sundowner 
Offshore Services, 523 
U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (de-
scribing the reluctance 
of lower courts to rec-
ognize same-sex har-
assment as discrimina-
tion); Brown v. CSC 
Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 
651, 658 (5th Cir. 
1995) (describing 
same-actor inference 
which views with skep-
ticism claims of dis-
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Phenomenon Observed Psychology Study Anti-Discrimination 
Literature / Case Law 
crimination where the 
hiring and firing man-
ager was the same) 
Findings of discrimina-
tion rare where the al-
leged discriminator has 
a good faith belief that 
did not discriminate 
(even where actual ba-
sis for actions factually 
false and based on ste-
reotypes). 
Swim et al. (2003) Krieger (2004); Krieger 
& Fiske (2006) 
No finding of sex har-
assment where harass-
ment at issue is non-
sexual (but nonetheless 
sex-based) in nature. 
Magley et al. (1999) Schultz (2006); Schultz 
(1998); Juliano & 
Schwab (2001) 
Requirement of actual 
harm to the victim in 
order to find discrimi-
nation. 
Swim et al. (2003) Singeltary v. Missouri 
Dep’t of Corrections, 
423 F.3d 886, 891–92 
(8th Cir. 2005) (de-
scribing adverse em-
ployment action re-
quirement) 
 
These extensive parallel findings make perfect sense if—as 
the findings of psychology scholars suggest—most people are 
driven by common background views in making assessments of 
whether or not to characterize a particular set of facts as dis-
crimination. Thus, for example, if both judges and lay people 
share a common view of discrimination—as a very rare, nar-
row, and generally explicit phenomena—it is unsurprising that 
both in the lab and in the courts, findings of discrimination are 
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rare, even where there is relatively strong evidence of invidious 
discriminatory intent.156 Similarly, it makes sense that—if peo-
ple’s shared “template” of discrimination is an act done by ma-
jority group members to minorities—both psychology subjects 
and judges would be more resistant to making findings of dis-
crimination where the roles are not filled by stereotypical ac-
tors (e.g., minority on minority discrimination).157 
In contrast, the striking similarities between the findings 
of psychology scholars and legal scholars are very difficult to 
explain if one assumes that judges and jurors—unlike the lay 
people studied in psychology studies—do not draw upon com-
mon background views in adjudicating discrimination claims. 
Indeed, what else except a common shared conception of “sex 
harassment” could explain the strikingly similar reluctance of 
both judges and lay people to characterize nonsexual (but sex-
based) harassment as sex harassment?158 Similarly, it is hard—
if not impossible—to explain why lay subjects in psychology 
studies would show a pattern of results comparable to the real-
world “good faith, honest belief rule” (developed by judges and 
typically applied at summary judgment) unless both derive 
from a common shared conception of discrimination as a phe-
nomenon that derives from conscious invidious intent (instead 
 
 156. Compare supra notes 58–82 and accompanying text (outlining the ex-
tensive support in the psychology literature for the conclusion that people re-
sist making attributions to discrimination), with supra notes 38, 41–42 and 
accompanying text (demonstrating that even cases with comparatively strong 
evidence of discrimination are often dismissed in litigation).  
 157. Compare supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (describing psy-
chological literature demonstrating that research subjects are less likely to 
make attributions to discrimination where the perpetrator and victim do not 
fit the “classic” discrimination scenario, e.g., majority on minority discrimina-
tion), with Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (de-
scribing the resistance of the lower courts to characterizing same-sex harass-
ment as discriminatory, and noting that some of the lower courts had 
categorically concluded that such harassment was non-actionable). 
 158. Compare Vicki J. Magley et al., Outcomes of Self-Labeling Sexual 
Harassment, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 390, 391–92 (1999) (describing this phe-
nomenon in the psychology study context), with Vicki Schultz, Understanding 
Sexual Harassment Law in Action: What Has Gone Wrong and What We Can 
Do About It, 29 THOMAS JEFFERSON L. REV. 101, 111–28 (2006) (describing 
this phenomenon in the courts), and Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual 
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1710–738 (1998) (same), and Ann Juliano & 
Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 548, 580–82 (2001) (same).  
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of from subconscious stereotypes).159 
Thus, the extensive parallels between the findings of psy-
chology scholars and the phenomena observed by legal scholars 
in the courts, strongly suggest that common background 
views—like those documented by psychology scholars—are 
playing a role in the contemporary adjudication of discrimina-
tion claims. Indeed, as other leading law and psychology schol-
ars have observed—in the absence of (rarely available) direct 
studies on judges or jurors—there are few more persuasive in-
dicators of a common underlying cause than this type of phe-
nomenological overlap between the findings of psychology 
scholars and the pattern of decisions in the courts.160 As a re-
sult, there are significant reasons to believe that real-world 
judges and jurors are—like the lay subjects studied by psychol-
ogy scholars—influenced by their background views regarding 
meritocracy and discrimination in determining what is  
discrimination. 
This conclusion is buttressed by a wealth of law and psy-
chology studies demonstrating that the findings of psychology 
scholars may, in general, provide a helpful indicator of what 
types of dynamics are animating judge and juror behavior in 
real cases.161 There are two similar but distinct ways that 
scholars have explored the likelihood that background beliefs 
and other common psychological phenomena are generally in-
fluencing real-world cases: (1) in relation to jurors, by compar-
ing results across a wide array of experimental conditions to 
see if the study format or population appears to affect the re-
sults; and (2) in relation to judges, by testing real-world judges 
to see if they behave in a similar manner to lay populations.  
The first of these approaches—used predominantly in the 
context of jury research—has focused on attempting to replicate 
 
 159. Compare Swim et al., Judgments of Prejudice, supra note 82, at 951, 
959 (showing pattern of results among lay subjects that is comparable to the 
real-world “good faith, honest belief ” rule), with Linda Hamilton Krieger, The 
Intuitive Psychologist Behind the Bench: Models of Gender Bias in Social Psy-
chology and Employment Discrimination Law, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 835, 839 
(2004) (describing and critiquing the use of the “good faith, honest belief ” rule 
by judges in discrimination litigation), and Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan 
T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bi-
as and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1034–38 (2006) (same). 
 160. See, e.g., Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision-
Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 34 (1998). 
 161. See infra notes 162–74 and accompanying text. 
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experimental results across an array of experimental condi-
tions.162 Thus, scholars have sought to replicate their findings 
with differing populations (typically students vs. a realistic “ju-
ry pool” population or real jurors) and across an array of study 
designs (ranging from a pencil and paper study design to real-
world trial conditions).163 These various studies—and a number 
of recent works that have compiled prior individualized find-
ings—have thus attempted to examine whether the common 
(and unrealistic) conditions in which most mock juror studies 
are conducted may undermine their “ecological validity”164 vis-
à-vis real-world jury behavior.165  
While the results of the foregoing “varied methodology” 
 
 162. See infra notes 162–68 and accompanying text. 
 163. See Robert M. Bray et al., The Effects of Defendant Status on the Deci-
sions of Student and Community Jurors, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 256, 258 (1978); 
Michael J. Crowley et al., The Juridical Impact of Psychological Expert Testi-
mony in a Simulated Child Sexual Abuse Trial, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 93 
(1994); Rogers Elliott & Robert J. Robinson, Death Penalty Attitudes and the 
Tendency to Convict or Acquit: Some Data, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 389, 395–
97 (1991); Norman J. Finkel & Sharon F. Handel, How Jurors Construe “In-
sanity,” 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 41, 48 (1989); Norman J. Finkel et al., Killing 
Kids: The Juvenile Death Penalty and Community Sentiment, 12 BEHAV. SCI. 
& L. 5, 13–14 (1994) [hereinafter Finkel et al., Killing Kids]; Norman J. Finkel 
et al., Right to Die, Euthanasia and Community Sentiment: Crossing the Pub-
lic/Private Boundary, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 487, 495 (1993) [hereinafter 
Finkel et al., Right to Die]; Solomon M. Fulero & Norman J. Finkel, Barring 
Ultimate Issue Testimony: An “Insane” Rule?, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 495, 500 
(1991); Geoffrey Kramer et al., Pretrial Publicity, Judicial Remedies and Jury 
Bias, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 423 (1990); Douglas J. Narby & Brian L. 
Cutler, Effectiveness of Voir Dire as a Safeguard in Eyewitness Cases, 79 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 724, 726–27 (1994); Caton F. Roberts & Stephen L. Gold-
ing, The Social Construction of Criminal Responsibility and Insanity, 15 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 349, 358 (1991); Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror 
Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-
Analysis, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 488 (2006); Douglas J. Zickafoose & 
Brian H. Bornstein, Double Discounting: The Effects of Comparative Negli-
gence on Mock Juror Decision Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 577, 588 
(1999); see also Vicki L. Fishfader et al., Evidential and Extralegal Factors in 
Juror Decisions: Presentation Mode, Retention, and Level of Emotionality, 20 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 565, 570–71 (1996) (examining the effect of different 
presentation modes for a different purpose, but also finding no material differ-
ences in outcomes). See generally Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity 
of Jury Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75 (1999) 
(collecting the findings of prior studies). 
 164. In the psychology field, “ecological validity” refers to the extent to 
which unrealistic study conditions may influence outcomes, thus rendering 
results unreliable in real-world conditions. 
 165. See sources cited supra note 163. 
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studies have not been entirely uniform, they have overwhelm-
ingly produced results supportive of the conclusion that psy-
chology studies, in general, provide a valuable indicator of real-
world jury decision-making.166 Indeed, in the overwhelming ma-
jority of studies, scholars have replicated findings with re-
markable consistency across a wide array of conditions, ranging 
from the very unrealistic (students in a lab) to real-world tri-
als.167 Thus, while there may be some circumstances in which 
psychology studies are unlikely to provide a valid indicator of 
real-world juror behavior (for example, student populations ap-
pear to be more sympathetic to criminal defendants than age-
differentiated populations, and thus moderately less likely to 
make guilty findings in criminal cases), it appears that psycho-
logical studies can often provide a useful starting point for un-
derstanding juror behavior.168 
A similar—but somewhat distinct—approach has been tak-
en by scholars towards assessing whether psychology studies 
may provide a helpful way of understanding the behavior of re-
al-world judges. Led by the work of Jeffrey Rachlinski, Andrew 
Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie, an array of recent studies have 
tested populations of real judges for the influence of particular 
psychological factors, and have compared those results to pre-
existing data involving lay populations.169 Thus, like the “varied 
 
 166. See infra note 167 and accompanying text. 
 167. See Bornstein, supra note 163, at 76–84; Bray et al., supra note 163, 
at 258–59; Crowley et al., supra note 163, at 93; Elliott & Robinson, supra note 
163, at 395–97; Finkel & Handel, supra note 163, at 48; Finkel et al., Killing 
Kids, supra note 163, at 13–14; Finkel et al., Right to Die, supra note 163, at 
495; Fulero & Finkel, supra note 163, at 500; Kramer et al., supra note 163, at 
423; Narby & Cutler, supra note 163, at 726–27; Roberts & Golding, supra 
note 163, at 358; Steblay et al., supra note 163, at 488; Zickafoose & Born-
stein, supra note 163, at 586. 
 168. See, e.g., Garrett L. Berman & Brian L. Cutler, Effects of Inconsisten-
cies in Eyewitness Testimony on Mock-Juror Decision Making, 81 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 170, 173–74 (1996); Bornstein, supra note 163, at 78–79; Rita James 
Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof: A View from the Bench, 
the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 319, 322 (1971). See general-
ly supra note 167 and accompanying text (demonstrating that remarkably 
similar results are achieved across an array of study conditions, from the real-
istic to the non-realistic). 
 169. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL 
L. REV. 777 (2001) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind]; Chris 
Guthrie et al., The “Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Execu-
tive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477 (2009) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., The 
Hidden Judiciary]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias 
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methodology” studies described above (used in the context of 
assessing jury behavior), the work of Rachlinski and his col-
leagues has attempted to provide a mechanism for gaining in-
sight into whether real-world judges are typically subject to the 
same types of influences that have been documented by psy-
chology scholars in lay subjects.170 
While research assessing real-world judges is newer—and 
thus less complete—than the research that has been conducted 
in the jury context, existing findings from the judge context al-
so strikingly support the conclusion that most of the time psy-
chology studies will provide a helpful basis for understanding 
real-world adjudicative behavior.171 Indeed, Rachlinski and his 
colleagues have identified a wide array of areas of overlap—and 
very few areas of divergence—between the factors that influ-
ence real-world judges and those that have been previously 
found to influence lay populations.172 Even in contexts where it 
seems likely that judges would be highly motivated to avoid 
behaving like lay populations (for example, studies of racial 
stereotypes or biases), judges quite regularly (albeit not uni-
formly) show very similar behavior to the behavior documented 
in lay populations of psychology subjects.173 It appears, then, 
 
Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) [hereinafter 
Rachlinski et al., Unconscious Racial Bias]; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside 
the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227 (2006) [hereinafter 
Rachlinski et al., Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind]; Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can 
Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disre-
garding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005); see also Abram Rosenblatt et al., Ev-
idence for Terror Management Theory: 1. The Effects of Mortality Salience on 
Reactions to Those Who Violate or Uphold Cultural Values, 57 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCH. 681, 682–83, 688 (1989) (finding that both judges and lay popu-
lations responded in accordance with “terror management theory” and thus 
recommended higher penalties for a moral transgressor when reminded of 
their own mortality). 
 170. See supra note 169. 
 171. See infra notes 172–74 and accompanying text. 
 172. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 169, at 
787–805; Guthrie et al., The Hidden Judiciary, supra note 169, at 1501–09, 
1512–16; Rachlinski et al., Unconscious Racial Bias, supra note 169, at 1210–
11; Rachlinski et al., Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, supra note 169, at 1233–37, 
1240–41; Rosenblatt et al., supra note 169, at 682–83; Wistrich et al., supra 
note 169, at 1251–52, 1286–93; see also Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating 
Juries By Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 469, 502 (2005) (finding that judges typically behave similarly to lay ju-
rors across an array of contexts). 
 173. The most striking example of this is found in a study that Jeffrey 
Rachlinski and his colleagues conducted testing a population of judges for sub-
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that judges—like the rest of us—are significantly influenced by 
their background beliefs and other common psychological fac-
tors in making adjudicative assessments.174  
Thus, the work of law and psychology scholars provides 
significant reasons to believe that psychology studies will often 
provide a quite accurate indicator of the type of dynamics that 
are influencing real-world judges and jurors. While real-world 
judges and jurors do sometimes diverge in the extent to which 
they are influenced by factors that have been previously exper-
imentally demonstrated in lay populations, they more common-
 
conscious racial biases (often referred to as “implicit biases”). It is clear that 
many of the judicial participants in the study were aware that the study was 
likely to be subjected to public scrutiny, as many participants were unwilling 
to even disclose the jurisdiction in which they adjudicated cases (presumably 
out of a fear of identification or backlash). Nevertheless, Rachlinski and his 
colleagues found that judges displayed implicit racial biases at roughly the 
same rates as the general population. See Rachlinski et al., Unconscious Ra-
cial Bias, supra note 169, at 1205, 1210–11.  
 174. Notably, one need not believe that judges are consciously abandoning 
their obligation towards neutral law-based adjudication in order to credit the 
results found by Rachlinski and his colleagues. Background views—and most 
other psychological phenomena—typically exercise their influence outside of 
the framework of conscious awareness. Thus, even a painstakingly conscien-
tious judge may be unaware of the role that background beliefs and other psy-
chological factors are playing in his or her decision-making. Moreover, even if 
a judge is aware of the possible influence of his or her background beliefs in a 
particular case, he or she will have no way of knowing how to adjust his or her 
approach, other than perhaps by taking a painstaking approach to considera-
tion of the facts and/or law (an approach that psychology scholars have docu-
mented does appear to make some difference in limiting the influence of men-
tal templates and other background beliefs). See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., 
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 31–
43 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench] (discussing meth-
ods of inducing deliberation and reducing the influence of psychological biases 
in judging); see also Dan Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? 
Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 
897–902 (2009) (discussing ways that judges may be able to reduce the effects 
of cognitive illiberalism); cf. Paul M. Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism and Insti-
tutional Debiasing Strategies, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (man-
uscript at 17–46), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1777104 (suggesting 
strategies that might reduce the influence of background beliefs on the adjudi-
cation of labor and employment claims). In contrast, a judge cannot simply at-
tempt to “correct” for the possible influence of background beliefs, since the 
fact that a judge may be predisposed to make defendant-favorable (or con-
versely plaintiff-favorable) findings, does not mean that in the particular case 
being adjudicated that the judge should deviate from his or her predisposition. 
Cf. Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench, supra, at 29–30 (noting that intuitive 
decision-making can sometimes produce more efficient while equally accurate 
decisions). 
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ly show a striking overlap with existing findings.175 Moreover, 
the unrealistic format in which psychology studies are conduct-
ed appears to have surprisingly little influence on outcomes, at 
least among mock juror populations (this feature has not—
perhaps because of the relative newness of studies on judges—
been studied in judges to date).176  
Thus, it appears that, as a general matter, psychology 
studies can provide a helpful starting point for understanding 
the results that we see in the courts. When coupled with the ex-
tensive overlap between the findings of psychology scholars and 
real-world outcomes in the courts in the discrimination area 
these findings provide a strong basis for believing that the 
types of background beliefs discussed in Part II are likely influ-
encing real-world discrimination outcomes. 
IV.  REFORM BY OTHER MEANS? IMPLICATIONS OF A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ACCOUNT FOR EFFORTS TO 
EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS DISCRIMINATION   
There are, then, substantial reasons to believe that the dif-
ficult odds faced by discrimination litigants arise at least in 
part from commonly shared American background beliefs. In-
deed, existing evidence strongly suggests that judges and jurors 
are influenced by their background beliefs about discrimination 
and the meritocratic foundations of our society; and that these 
beliefs tend to lead to adverse outcomes for discrimination 
claimants. Thus, while further research is required to confirm 
the influence of background beliefs on real-world outcomes in 
discrimination cases, it is worth taking seriously the possibility 
that such beliefs are an important driver of the difficult odds 
that discrimination litigants face. What are the implications of 
taking seriously this type of an account?  
While a complete answer to this question is beyond the 
scope of this Article,177 it is possible to identify for initial discus-
 
 175. See supra notes 160–74 and accompanying text. 
 176. See supra notes 160–74 and accompanying text. 
 177. For example, how—if at all—litigants can or should call to the atten-
tion of judges the possibility that background beliefs of the kind described by 
psychologists are influencing their decision-making in discrimination cases is 
a complex question, beyond the scope of my discussion here. Similarly, I do not 
elaborate on the implications of the findings of psychology scholars for at-
tempts to answer important empirical questions in the field of discrimination 
law, including most notably the role of merit in adverse discrimination out-
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sion several of the most important implications here. First, as 
elaborated below, the findings of psychology scholars—which 
point to widely held background beliefs as an important cause 
of the difficulties faced by discrimination litigants—strongly 
suggest the need to rethink prevalent scholarly approaches to 
anti-discrimination reform. Indeed, crediting the findings of 
psychology scholars, both of the most commonly suggested 
types of reform seem likely to have significant limitations as 
mechanisms for meaningfully improving outcomes for discrimi-
nation litigants.178 
Second—as a corollary of this first point—it may be neces-
sary to think creatively about how we can improve outcomes for 
putative victims of discrimination. As set forth below, one pos-
sible alternative, which has been rarely addressed in the legal 
literature to date, would be to make increased use of approach-
es that do not focus on group-based discrimination claims (e.g., 
 
comes. Finally, I do not attempt to answer (although I briefly touch on, infra 
note 178) the deeper philosophical questions that the findings of psychology 
scholars raise—such as whether, in a democracy, it is appropriate (or even de-
sirable) for the widespread views of the public regarding what “is” discrimina-
tion to find expression in the day to day adjudication of individual legal cases. 
 178. Of course, the question of whether the profoundly low success rates 
that discrimination litigants currently face should be improved, or are instead 
appropriate (either because they reflect an actual lack of discrimination or be-
cause they are congruent with public beliefs), is itself deeply contested. A full 
exploration of this question is well beyond the scope of this Article. However, it 
is worth observing that particularly in the area of discrimination—where the 
groups who are the intended beneficiaries of the law are likely to have diver-
gent views from the general population regarding the merits of the claims that 
are being dismissed—there may be profound legitimacy concerns about per-
mitting the continuation of a regime that with near-universality rejects the 
claims that are being made under the law (and that overwhelmingly relies on 
judge-effectuated procedural devices as the mechanism for doing so). See, e.g., 
Robinson, supra note 6, at 1106–17 (describing extensive evidence of minori-
ty/majority gaps in perceptions of discrimination); see also Kahan et al., supra 
note 174, at 881–87, 895–97 (describing the legitimacy concerns that are 
raised by courts summarily dismissing claims that an identifiable section of 
society would perceive as meritorious); Burbank Letter, supra note 42, at 11–
12 (noting that the behavior of judges in the employment discrimination con-
text may be an example of the type of cognitive illiberalism described by 
Kahan, supra). The remedy I propose in this Article—increased use of ap-
proaches that in some way remediate discrimination, but that ask a distinct 
liability question—can be seen as a compromise approach, insofar as it could 
potentially improve outcomes for putative victims of discrimination while not 
requiring the adoption of a legal regime that is deeply divergent from most 
people’s beliefs about what discrimination “is.” See infra Part IV.B. 
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just-cause claims or Family and Medical Leave Act claims).179 
Indeed, such “extra-discrimination remedies” (EDRs)—because 
of their independence from commonly held understandings of 
“discrimination”—seem uniquely situated to avoid many of the 
difficulties that discrimination litigants have faced in bringing 
discrimination claims. 
A. THE LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT APPROACHES TO REFORM 
Legal scholars have traditionally focused on doctrinal re-
form of the anti-discrimination laws as the leading remedy for 
the perceived limitations of the anti-discrimination regime.180 
Across a wide array of contexts over the span of decades, legal 
scholars have repeatedly turned to doctrinal reform recommen-
dations (often to be judicially effectuated, although sometimes 
requiring legislative action) as the centerpiece of their recom-
mendations for improving outcomes for discrimination liti-
 
 179. There is a robust literature addressing individually many of the non-
group-based claims I discuss here, but relatively little that has looked globally 
at such claims as an alternative to the anti-discrimination laws. But cf. Jessica 
A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protec-
tions, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1240–51 (2011) (discussing the general movement to-
wards universalized claims as opposed to discrimination-focused claims in 
employment law, and offering a number of critiques of this move). For a few of 
the works that have looked at just-cause regimes specifically as an alternative 
to the discrimination laws, see, for example, Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Law of 
Termination: Doing More with Less, 68 MD. L. REV. 89, 100–07 (2008); Ann C. 
McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coher-
ent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1509–24 (1996). For a 
discussion of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) as an alternative to 
traditional discrimination-law approaches (and an argument that it is superior 
for effectuating certain types of change), see Catherine Albiston, Institutional 
Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1093, 1157–65.  
 180. It would be impossible to catalog here the many thoughtful recom-
mendations for doctrinal reform of the anti-discrimination laws that have been 
put forward in the last several decades. For a few recent examples, see, for ex-
ample, Krieger & Fiske, supra note 159, at 1052–60; Sullivan, The Phoenix, 
supra note 35, at 192–97 (2009); Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Trans-
formative Potential of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 3, 46–92 (2005); see also Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego and 
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 
355–56, 387 (1987) (recommending doctrinal reform suggestions as a partial 
solution, but also acknowledging the practical difficulties that would exist in 
implementing doctrinal reform suggestions); Robinson, supra note 6, at 1152–
70; (same); and compare Gelbach et al., supra note 6, at 847–48 (discussing the 
possibility of doctrinal reform as a solution, but also noting the potential risks 
of such an approach). 
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gants.181 These doctrinal reform recommendations—while often 
carefully researched and persuasively reasoned—have very 
rarely been put into practice.182 Moreover, even where doctrinal 
reforms have been adopted, they appear to have had a relative-
ly minimal impact on the outcome of most discrimination 
claims.183 Thus, despite decades of thoughtful scholarly pro-
posals, discrimination litigants today remain subject to ex-
tremely difficult odds, with a substantially lower likelihood of 
success than virtually any other category of federal litigants.184 
These results are unsurprising from the perspective of a 
psychological account of the current limitations of anti-
discrimination law. Indeed, taking a psychological account seri-
ously, it seems highly likely that the very same belief systems 
that have limited individual discrimination litigants’ chances 
for success will effectively impede efforts to convince judges 
and/or legislators to adopt substantial doctrinal reforms of the 
anti-discrimination laws. If a judge or legislator does not see a 
specific set of facts as discrimination, there is little reason to 
believe that he or she will be willing to adopt a doctrinal reform 
designed to codify such an understanding as binding law.185 
Thus, for many of the same reasons discussed in Part II, it 
 
 181. See supra note 180. 
 182. There are several notable exceptions. For example, it is widely 
acknowledged that modern sexual harassment doctrine owes much of a debt to 
the academic work of Catherine MacKinnon, among others. See, e.g., Cass R. 
Sunstein, Feminism and Legal Theory, 101 HARV. L. REV. 826, 829 (1988) (re-
viewing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987)); Mari-
anne Wesson, Sex, Lies and Videotape: The Pornographer as Censor, 66 WASH. 
L. REV. 913, 926 (1991); see also MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEM-
INIST LEGAL THEORY 237–38 (2d ed. 1999). For a recent essay by Catherine 
MacKinnon criticizing existing sex discrimination doctrine, see Catherine A. 
MacKinnon, Substantive Equality: A Perspective, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 183. See supra Part I. In addition to the exceptions discussed above, supra 
note 182, it seems likely that the addition of a right to a jury trial in the 1991 
Civil Rights Act resulted in some improvement in trial outcomes for discrimi-
nation litigants. See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, From Bad to Worse, supra note 
27, at 116, 130–31 (documenting that discrimination litigants consistently fare 
better in jury trials than in bench trials).  
 184. See supra Part I.  
 185. Catherine Albiston has made a very similar observation in the context 
of examining the ways that widespread and entrenched norms regarding what 
work “is” shape the scope of discrimination protections that judges are willing 
to afford. See Albiston, supra note 179, at 1128–57; cf. Bagenstos, supra note 
35, at 44–45 (discussing the problems that entrenched judicial views of the 
meaning of discrimination hold for many contemporary proposals to address 
structural discrimination).  
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seems unlikely that most truly significant doctrinal reforms of 
the anti-discrimination laws will be adopted in the first  
instance.186 
Perhaps even more significantly, taking a psychological ac-
count seriously calls into doubt whether even “successful” doc-
trinal reforms (i.e., those adopted by a court or legislature) will 
have the intended effects of significantly improving outcomes 
for discrimination litigants.187 In many, albeit certainly not all, 
cases there will be room for even a conscientious judge or juror 
to reach more than one result, even where a particular doctri-
nal loophole has been closed or a particular reform has been ef-
fectuated.188 This capaciousness of possibilities is not systemati-
cally problematic, if one assumes that judges and jurors in fact 
behave as idealized adjudicators, with no common directional 
biases. While one case may go against a discrimination litigant, 
 
 186. For example, one of the most obvious potential reforms of the anti-
discrimination laws, institution of a “pretext only” regime (i.e., a regime in 
which a finding of discrimination is required where a prima facie case and pre-
text have been proven), has been legislatively attempted, but has failed to 
achieve significant levels of support. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of 
Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary’s 
Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext and the “Personality” Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 239 (1997); see also infra note 248 (discussing further the 
possibility of using a “pretext only regime). See generally Michael Z. Green, 
Addressing Race Discrimination Under Title VII After Forty Years: The Prom-
ise of ADR as Interest-Convergence, 48 HOW. L.J. 937, 952–53 (2005) (noting 
that all efforts to amend Title VII during the fourteen-year time frame be-
tween the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and 2005 had failed).  
 187. There are significant selection effects problems with trying to rigor-
ously measure the impact of particular doctrinal reforms, since such doctrinal 
reforms typically also result in an increased number of claims. To the extent 
that scholars have endeavored to do so in the discrimination law context, they 
have typically not found statistically significant effects. See, e.g., Juliano & 
Schwab, supra note 158, at 554, 575–77; see also infra note 191 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the backlash that followed the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act’s (ADA) institution of a much more plaintiff-favorable understanding 
of discrimination).  
 188. This is particularly true of doctrinal reforms that would simply elimi-
nate intermediate burdens on the plaintiff, but that do not place radical struc-
tural limitations on judges’ or jurors’ discretion on the ultimate question of 
discrimination. So long as the ultimate question remains whether discrimina-
tion has occurred (and the decision-maker retains discretion to define what 
discrimination is), there is nothing to stop a judge or a juror from finding 
against a plaintiff on the ultimate question, as opposed to some intermediate 
doctrinal obstacle. The findings of psychology scholars—as well as existing ex-
perience to date in the federal courts—strongly suggest that this is likely to be 
a significant impediment to improving success rates for discrimination plain-
tiffs, even where intermediate doctrinal obstacles have been removed.  
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another will go against the defense, and the particular reform 
will, overall, have its desired result. 
If, however—as the findings of psychology scholars sug-
gest—most people are predisposed to minimize the likelihood of 
discrimination, the “close calls” are likely to predominantly be 
made in a manner unfavorable to discrimination litigants. Over 
time, the accretive nature of the law means that results—even 
if originally bolstered by a particular doctrinal reform—will ul-
timately come to resemble roughly the state of affairs that we 
currently face, with discrimination litigants facing extremely 
difficult odds.189 And in fact, it is precisely this dynamic that 
appears to have substantially led to the current state of affairs. 
Discrimination law’s “meaning,” abysmal as it is for most dis-
crimination litigants, has not been crafted exclusively, or even 
principally, through sweeping anti-plaintiff Supreme Court de-
cisions, but through the multiplicity of plaintiff-unfavorable in-
dividualized judgments in the district courts and courts of  
appeals.190  
Equally problematically, both psychology and legal schol-
ars have documented that reforms that deviate too far from 
prevailing understandings of what constitutes discrimination 
(which among most people are fairly restricted) are likely to be 
even more directly undercut. For example, as Linda Hamilton 
Krieger and others have described, a substantial “sociolegal 
backlash” (characterized by, inter alia a disregard of explicit 
statutory provisions, of agency guidance, and of legislative his-
tory) accompanied the ADA’s enactment, and its pressing of a 
more expansive legal understanding of discrimination.191 Psy-
 
 189. This phenomenon roughly resembles what Linda Hamilton Krieger 
has referred to as “sociolegal capture.” See Krieger, supra note 35, at 347–51. 
 190. For a discussion of this issue in the ADA context, see e.g., Mathew 
Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model of Disability, in 
BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra 
note 35, at 62, 66–72. This phenomenon (i.e., the accretion of plaintiff-
unfavorable standards through numerous individualized judgments) has sig-
nificant drawbacks, insofar as it allows important policy choices about what 
discrimination is to be obscured under the guise of doctrinal and factual tech-
nicalities. This hiding-the-ball approach makes many important choices about 
the shape of discrimination law difficult to attack directly, as they are couched 
in the language of individualized circumstances, rendering them facially 
(while not genuinely) unimportant. 
 191. Krieger, supra note 35, at 361–82; see also Bagenstos, supra note 35, 
at 43 & nn.223–24; Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating 
Measures: Judicial Construction of the Meaning of Disability, in BACKLASH 
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chology scholars have documented a similar phenomenon 
among lay people, who, for example, report an inability or un-
willingness to follow instructions directing them to apply a 
“reasonable woman” standard in sexual harassment cases, and 
who report confusion and an inability to properly apply instruc-
tions that require them to treat disparate impact as a form of 
discrimination.192 Thus, more substantial reforms may be lim-
ited through more direct retrenchment even if they make it 
through the initial hurdles to adoption.193  
There are thus substantial reasons to be skeptical of the ef-
ficacy of doctrinal reform under a psychological understanding 
of the current dynamics of discrimination litigation. Taking se-
riously such a psychological understanding (and history) sug-
gests that such reforms are—as a general matter—unlikely to 
be adopted. Moreover, they seem unlikely, even if adopted, to 
result in systematic change. Whether through the slow accre-
tive process of anti-plaintiff results, or through direct backlash, 
doctrinally driven efforts to reform the prevailing (and limited) 
conception of discrimination seem unlikely (absent accompany-
ing social change) to fundamentally succeed in their transform-
ative project.194  
So if doctrinal reform of the discrimination laws seems an 
unlikely remedy for the current limits of the American anti-
discrimination program, what is the alternative? One alterna-
tive proposal that has become increasingly popular among legal 
scholars in recent years is private institutional reform, effectu-
 
AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 35, at 
122, 149–50; Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the 
Americans With Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 
TENN. L. REV. 311, 315 (2009). 
 192. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 6, at 1161; E-Mail from Laurie T. 
O’Brien, supra note 90.  
 193. This phenomenon—i.e., disregarding legal instructions that are con-
trary to culturally meaningful lay understandings—has also been documented 
in other areas of the law. For an excellent discussion of findings on this issue 
in the criminal law context as well as a theoretical discussion of the potential 
reasons for it, see Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Per-
ceives What, and Why in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 
793–97 (2010).  
 194. While space does not permit full exposition of the normative implica-
tions of using doctrinal reform as a method of remedying the difficult odds 
that discrimination litigants face, it should be noted that there may also be 
significant normative considerations that militate against attempting to use 
doctrinal reform as the primary method for attempting to override the influ-
ence of widely shared background beliefs. 
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ated by and within the very institutions that are the potential 
situses of discriminatory events (for example, employers).195 
These recommendations have taken a wide variety of forms, 
but have been united in their consensus that many of the in-
tractable problems of contemporary discrimination are a poor 
fit for our existing model of judicially enforced discrimination 
laws.196 They thus have recommended a turn to private institu-
tional actors as the primary agents of change.197 For example, 
some scholars have suggested that employers be encouraged to 
adopt more effective internal systems for detecting and remedi-
ating discrimination, or to adopt policies that help avoid “second 
generation” employment discrimination problems (such as the 
difficulties that women and people with disabilities dispropor-
tionally face in meeting stringent “face time” requirements).198 
While these more recent institutional reform recommenda-
tions are thoughtful and often powerfully argued (as their doc-
trinal predecessors were), there are obvious and significant ob-
stacles to their success, particularly in their more radical 
iterations.199 Most notably, to the extent that scholars proposing 
 
 195. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: 
Towards an Incentivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment 
Quality for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 25, 63–74; Robinson, supra note 6, 
at 1170–79; Sturm, supra note 36, at 553–66. 
 196. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 195, at 30–45, 84–86; Sturm, 
supra note 36, at 475–79. 
 197. See supra note 195. 
 198. See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 195, at 29–30, 84–86; Sturm, 
supra note 36, at 475–79. 
 199. I should note that I am not suggesting that civil rights law is ineffec-
tive in institutionalizing lower levels of employer discrimination, as compared 
to a “no law on the books” regime. Indeed, existing work suggests that provid-
ing for formal anti-discrimination protections for particular groups may play a 
very important role in reducing discrimination and furthering economic pro-
gress for protected groups (although there are often difficulties in measuring 
the extent of effects). See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Con-
tinuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on the Eco-
nomic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603, 1640–41 (1991) (noting 
that results are consistent with the conclusion that civil rights law and en-
forcement played a major role in African American economic advancement in 
the 1960s and 1970s but that other factors, such as improved education, also 
played a role). This Part addresses the distinct issue of whether it is realistic 
to expect that—to the extent that discrimination persists despite formal legal 
protections—institutional reform is likely to provide a particularly effective 
vehicle for reform. Cf. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic 
Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 
1531, 1567–68 (1992) (discussing the ways that civil rights law has led to in-
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such reforms rely on judicial oversight as a motivational mech-
anism for ensuring the effectiveness of private institutional re-
form (for example, by making legal liability contingent on the 
implementation of an “effective” process of internal problem 
solving for discrimination-related issues), they are likely to face 
precisely the same obstacles that direct doctrinal reform has 
encountered. As Samuel Bagenstos has persuasively argued, 
“[j]udges who are committed to an individualized, fault-based 
understanding of employment discrimination law” are unlikely 
to enforce robust requirements for private institutional reform, 
whether they are the primary implementers of such reforms or 
simply (as the private institutional scholars propose) the 
watchdogs of failures of compliance.200 There is little reason to 
believe that a simple change of focus (from direct judicial en-
forcement to judicial monitoring of private enforcement) will 
expand judicial conceptions of discrimination or the concomi-
tant narrowness of focus that currently prevails in judicial ap-
proaches to discrimination litigation.  
Absent the “stick” of effective judicial monitoring, pro-
posals for private institutional reform must rely on private em-
ployers themselves (and/or institutional intermediaries such as 
HR consultants) to be the guardians of effective reform. But, 
there are profound reasons to be skeptical of the efficacy of re-
lying on employers and HR consultants as a means of promot-
ing true change. If, as psychology scholars have documented, 
most people do not see discrimination in all but the most egre-
gious circumstances, how can we expect even good-faith private 
institutional actors to meaningfully detect the problems they 
are trying to correct?201 And, while reforms can be adopted even 
in the absence of a full understanding of contemporary discrim-
ination (and indeed are often justified today in terms which are 
substantially or entirely divorced from a recognition of ongoing 
 
stitutionalization of equal employment opportunity and affirmative action 
practices by employers, but noting that the institutionalization of such prac-
tices may not lead to real results). See generally infra note 205 (regarding the 
mixed success of institutionalized equal employment opportunity practices in 
reducing discrimination and improving employment rates for protected 
groups).  
 200. Bagenstos, supra note 35, at 44. 
 201. Cf. Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice, supra note 2, at 33–34 (finding 
that even in confidential after-the-fact interviews, defendants in discrimina-
tion lawsuits consistently maintained that they had not discriminated).  
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discrimination),202 how effective can such policies—decoupled 
from an understanding of their purpose—be?  
Sociological research confirms the intuition that there are 
reasons to be deeply concerned about advocating primary reli-
ance on employer-driven institutional reforms, particularly in-
sofar as those reforms have been decoupled from robust percep-
tions of continuing discriminatory practices. At this juncture, a 
wide range of diversity reforms (ranging from diversity training 
to affirmative action to work/family balance measures) have 
been voluntarily adopted by American workplaces, affording 
the opportunity to study both the mechanics of adoption and 
the outcomes of such measures.203 What such research suggests 
is that, first, most firms adopt reforms not for their actual effi-
cacy in reducing discrimination (or in response to perceived dis-
crimination), but for their perceived value in increasing stabil-
ity and limiting legal liability,204 and second, that many existing 
 
 202. See, e.g., FRANK DOBBIN, INVENTING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 158–59, 
231–32 (2009) (documenting that many equal opportunity policies have been 
justified and adopted by businesses for reasons unrelated to an actual desire 
to remediate ongoing discrimination); see also Lauren B. Edelman et al., Di-
versity Rhetoric and the Managerialization of Law, 106 AM. J. SOC. 1589, 
1589–91, 1620–21, 1626 (2001) (discussing the rise of diversity rhetoric as a 
justification for internal employer reforms, and documenting the self-conscious 
divorcing of such rhetoric from the need to remediate or address discrimination). 
 203. See, e.g., Alexandra Kalev et al., Best Practices or Best Guesses? As-
sessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies, 71 
AM. SOC. REV. 589, 599 fig.2 (2006) (tracking the adoption of various forms of 
diversity programs by medium and large employers over time). Strikingly, de-
spite the existence of widespread EEO-related reforms—and extensive re-
search regarding their adoption by organizations—there have been until re-
cently very few systematic studies of the efficacy of such reforms. Id. at 590; 
see also DOBBIN, supra note 202, at 21 (“One of the most surprising things 
about the compliance regimes that corporations popularized is that they re-
main largely untested.”). The study by Kalev and her colleagues is one of the 
most systematic attempts to date to investigate the actual influence of such 
policies on outcomes, although there are also others. See infra note 205. 
 204. See, e.g., DOBBIN, supra note 202, at 223; Frank Dobbin & Erin L. 
Kelly, How to Stop Harassment: Professional Construction of Legal Compli-
ance in Organizations, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1203, 1204, 1234–37 (2007); Kalev et 
al., supra note 203, at 610. The same may not be true of the HR professionals 
and consultants who are the primary advocates of such internal policies (alt-
hough typically not the decision-makers on whether the policies are adopted). 
It appears that there may be a sincere commitment on the part of many such 
professionals to the principle of equal opportunity. See, e.g., DOBBIN, supra 
note 202, at 158–59. But cf. Edelman et al., supra note 202 (describing the rise 
of “diversity” rhetoric in the professional management literature, and the ex-
tent to which it was often characterized in contradistinction to, and as superi-
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reforms are at best modestly effective and may even be coun-
terproductive in achieving anti-discrimination outcomes.205 For 
example, recent research has shown that businesses’ adoption 
of the most common form of diversity training is followed by a 
substantial decrease—of approximately 10%—in minority and 
female representation in management.206 Moreover, it appears 
 
or to, more traditional EEO-based or affirmative action-based approaches). 
Nevertheless, even in this context, there appear to have been very limited ef-
forts to ascertain and act on the actual efficacy of reforms. See infra note 207 
and accompanying text. 
 205. See Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and 
Substance in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
959, 972–76 (1999); Meg A. Bond & Jean L. Pyle, Diversity Dilemmas at Work, 
7 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 252, 262 (1998); Frank Dobbin, et al., You Can’t Always 
Get What You Need: Organizational Determinants of Diversity Programs, 76 
AM. SOC. REV. 386, 406 (2011); Kalev et al., supra note 203, at 605 tbl.3; see 
also Catherine Albiston, Institutional Perspectives on Law, Work, and Family, 
3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 408 (2007) (describing how organizational 
work/family policies may have limited effectiveness in practice); Joanna L. 
Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Sub-
stance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 41 & n.225 
(2003) (“Since surveys began to track levels of harassment more than twenty 
years ago, the number of employers enacting and disseminating anti-
harassment policies has grown exponentially while the underlying level of 
harassment has gone unchanged.”); Madeline E. Heilman et al., The Affirma-
tive Action Stigma of Incompetence: Effects of Performance Information Ambi-
guity, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 603 passim (1997) (showing that, in the experi-
mental context, affirmative action beneficiaries were perceived as less 
competent and recommended for lower salary increases); Erin L. Kelly et al., 
Getting There From Here: Research on the Effects of Work-Family Initiatives 
on Work-Family Conflict and Business Outcomes, 2 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 305 
passim (2008) (showing mixed results of compiled studies regarding the effec-
tiveness of work-family initiatives, including some studies that have found 
negative correlations between such policies and positive outcome measures); 
Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher 
Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 228–35 (2004) (discussing 
mixed results of research studying the effectiveness of anti-harassment poli-
cies); cf. Lauren Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transfor-
mation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497, 508–19 
(1993) (performing qualitative analysis of the handling of civil rights com-
plaints by internal corporate complaint handlers, and showing that such com-
plaints were typically recast in non-EEO terms (e.g., as simple personality 
conflicts or poor management) and dealt with through measures designed to 
diffuse tension as opposed to measures aimed at effectively remediating or 
preventing future discrimination); Lauren Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of 
Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 
406, 448–49 (1999) (noting that when the courts “adopt forms of compliance 
created within organizational fields, they run the risk of institutionalizing the 
very forms of discrimination that laws were originally designed to alleviate”). 
 206. See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam, Most Diversity Training Ineffective, 
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that employers are unlikely to abandon or modify existing pro-
grams in response to ineffectiveness, even where those pro-
grams are affirmatively counter-productive from the perspec-
tive of anti-discrimination outcomes.207 
Of course, all this does not mean that voluntary reforms 
are universally ineffective or have no role to play in promoting 
equality. To the contrary, existing research makes clear that 
some private institutional reforms—most notably those geared 
towards creating clear lines of responsibility and clear 
measures for success—do have significant effects on the actual 
representation of women and minority workers.208 And, as to 
numerous other reforms—such as those aimed at promoting 
work/life balance—the verdict remains out, with some studies 
suggesting efficacy and others suggesting little, or counter-
productive, effects.209 Thus, further pursuit of institutional re-
forms may well be worthwhile, insofar as such reforms are tai-
lored to the developing findings regarding what programs are 
actually effective in achieving anti-discrimination goals. Never-
theless, existing research suggests that, like doctrinal reform, 
such reforms are unlikely to provide a panacea for preventing 
or remedying discrimination, and indeed suggests the need to 
proceed with caution in promoting further efforts at voluntary 
reform. 
A final possible solution to the problems of contemporary 
 
Study Finds, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2008, at A3 (describing the results of a fol-
low-up study conducted by Alexandra Kalev that is not yet in publication). 
 207. See, e.g., Kalev et al., supra note 203, at 599 fig.2, 605 tbl.3 (docu-
menting that diversity training—whose only statistically significant impact is 
a reduction in representation of certain minority groups—has been by far the 
fastest growing category of diversity programming during the most recent 
decade studied). See generally supra note 203 (noting that minimal efforts 
have been made to study the efficacy of equal opportunity programs, despite 
their widespread adoption by American companies). 
 208. See, e.g., Kalev et al., supra note 203, at 602–04 (reporting research 
results showing that “[t]he most effective practices are those that establish or-
ganizational responsibility: affirmative action plans, diversity staff, and diver-
sity task forces”). 
 209. See, e.g., Albiston, supra note 205, at 407–09 (describing research on 
the efficacy and limitations of work/family policies); Grossman, supra note 
205, at 41–49 (describing mixed research regarding the efficacy of anti-
harassment policies and practices); Kelly et al., supra note 205 (providing a 
broad overview of work-family initiatives scholarship, and discussing the 
mixed results that such scholarship has found regarding effectiveness); Law-
ton, supra note 205, at 228–35 (discussing mixed results of research studying 
the effectiveness of anti-harassment policies).  
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discrimination law that has sometimes—albeit much less fre-
quently—been discussed by legal scholars is the possibility of 
modifying judge and juror attitudes towards discrimination 
cases by pursuing social change through public education or 
other means.210 In theory, this type of social change work is an 
obvious (and perhaps the most obvious) response to the find-
ings of psychologists detailed in Part II. If people’s background 
views about issues such as meritocracy, the incidence of dis-
crimination, and discriminatory prototypes can be changed, ex-
isting psychological research provides every reason to believe 
that many of the limitations of contemporary discrimination 
law could be erased. And, there is evidence that at least some of 
these views are mutable over time, suggesting their susceptibil-
ity to external influence.211  
However, existing evidence also suggests that to the extent 
there have been shifts in these discrimination-related views, 
they have been towards viewpoints that are increasingly unfa-
vorable for discrimination litigants (for example, perceptions of 
discrimination as rare have become increasingly common over 
time).212 Moreover, existing psychological research provides 
 
 210. See, e.g., Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and the 
Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1521–28 
(2005) (“Consequently, it is crystal clear that the first step in any campaign to 
eliminate racial castes in education must be consciousness raising and ‘cogni-
tive liberation’ about the validity of the tests themselves.”); Travis, supra note 
191, at 377–78 (addressing strategies to address ADA backlash); see also Jus-
tin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking and 
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 418–20 (2007) (arguing for the importance 
of social change as a mechanism for reducing implicit biases). 
 211. See, e.g., KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 98, at 186–91 (showing shift-
ing views about racial discrimination and equality of opportunity in the 
1970s); see also Washington Post-Kaiser Family Foundation poll, Q#34 (2011), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postkaiserpoll_ 
110211.html ( last visited March 27, 2012) (showing a 7% increase in the pro-
portion of respondents reporting that racism is not a problem in our society 
between 1995 and 2011). 
 212. See KLUEGEL & SMITH, supra note 98, at 186–91; Washington Post-
Kaiser Family Foundation poll, supra note 211, at Q#34. This conclusion is 
also supported by the shift in the perspective of the federal judiciary, which 
originally developed a number of the fundamental doctrinal tests governing 
Title VII based on the assumption that discrimination was a relatively likely 
explanation for the disparate treatment of African Americans. See, e.g., Tex. 
Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (stating that the 
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case “raises an inference of discrimination on-
ly because we presume that these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more 
likely than not based on the consideration of [discriminatory] factors” (quota-
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substantial reasons to suspect that, in the long term, meritoc-
racy beliefs (e.g., the belief that everyone can get ahead in life) 
may be the lynchpin of the difficulties faced by anti-
discrimination litigants—and that this set of beliefs, in particu-
lar, is likely to resist efforts at change.213 Finally, the experi-
ence of civil rights organizations in continuing to attempt to 
promote this type of change throughout the last several decades 
is not encouraging. Despite ongoing efforts to publicize continu-
ing egregious incidents of discrimination, and to institutional-
ize broader understandings of discrimination, the public con-
tinues to adhere strongly to the view that discrimination is a 
rare, explicit, and narrow phenomenon and that America is 
fundamentally a meritocracy.214 Thus, while continuing efforts 
at social change are obviously critically important to ongoing 
efforts to remedy the difficulties of discrimination law, the 
mechanisms for effectuating such change are far from clear.215  
Thus, taking seriously a psychological account, none of the 
principal existing academic reform proposals seems likely to re-
sult in a radical reconfiguration of the current difficulties that 
 
tion omitted)).  
 213. See, e.g., Lipkus & Siegler, supra note 108, at 470 (“[M]eritocracy be-
liefs may have a causal influence on conceptions of racism.”); O’Brien et al., 
supra note 104, at 437–39 (showing that meritocracy beliefs are a significant 
predictor of the adoption of narrow individualistic understandings of discrimi-
nation, and that such narrow individualistic understandings of discrimination 
are associated with decreased perceptions of the incidence of discrimination in 
specific circumstances); see also Jost & Hunyady, supra note 101, at 260–64 
(describing the psychological antecedents and benefits of adopting meritocracy 
beliefs, and suggesting that such beliefs are widespread because they fill a 
common need to justify the status quo). See generally supra notes 98–100 and 
accompanying text (describing the overwhelming prevalence of meritocracy 
beliefs in American society). 
 214. See supra notes 98–100, 147–48 and accompanying text. 
 215. Of course, even in today’s society, ascription to the view that discrimi-
nation is a rare, narrow phenomenon varies to some extent across groups. See 
supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text. Thus, one possible reform that 
might avoid the need for broad-based social change would be the increased ap-
pointment of individuals who are from groups more likely to subscribe to dis-
crimination-litigant friendly views to the bench (this might include, for exam-
ple, the appointment of minority and women judges, but also the appointment 
of more plaintiff-side litigators and progressive scholars). Several studies have 
shown that such judges are in fact more likely to rule in favor of discrimina-
tion litigants. See supra note 149 and accompanying text; cf. Scott A. Moss, 
Judicial Hostility to Litigation and How it Impairs Legal Accountability for 
Corporations and Other Defendants, 4 ADVANCE 5, 20–22 (2010) (arguing that 
the uniformity of the Justices’ backgrounds on the Supreme Court has led to 
an anti-litigation outlook that pervades the Court’s contemporary case law). 
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putative victims of discrimination face. As a result, it is im-
portant to explore other alternative measures that may provide 
an alternate means of redress, and that may be less likely to 
implicate restrictive American background beliefs. In the fol-
lowing Section, I turn to a discussion of one such alternative, 
i.e., extra-discrimination remedies.  
B. THE ALTERNATIVE OF EXTRA-DISCRIMINATION REMEDIES 
Extra-discrimination remedies (EDRs), as I use the term, 
are remedies that in some way address questions of discrimina-
tion (or that allow a putative victim of discrimination to chal-
lenge a discriminatory job action), but that do not ask the lia-
bility question of “discrimination.” (For example, just-cause 
claims, which allow employees to challenge unfair firings of any 
kind, and Family and Medical Leave Act claims, which allow 
employees to challenge family or medical leave-related termi-
nations, are both examples of what I refer to as EDRs). While 
EDRs do not feature prominently in the existing anti-
discrimination literature,216 they are in fact hardly a novel in-
novation in the real world of anti-discrimination litigation. 
Thus, for example, a disabled employee who is terminated after 
taking medical leave will often file a single lawsuit, alleging 
that her termination was both discriminatory (on the basis of 
disability) and a violation of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act’s protected leave provisions. Similarly, in states whose 
statutes or common law permit a “just cause” cause of action, 
minority employees often claim that their firing was both dis-
criminatory and made without just cause. As a result, my dis-
cussion here relates to the possibility of increased use of exist-
ing EDRs, as well as legislative advocacy for more widely 
available EDRs, rather than an entirely new approach to con-
ceptualizing and litigating discrimination claims.  
As set forth below, there are ample reasons for believing 
that this approach—i.e., increased use of and legislative advo-
cacy for EDRs—may reap significant benefits for putative vic-
tims of discrimination. Indeed, taking seriously the findings of 
psychology scholars, it seems likely that EDRs will be uniquely 
 
 216. I do not mean to suggest that I am alone in discussing this possibility, 
although many of the prior works have focused on a specific EDR as an alter-
native or supplement to discrimination claims, as opposed to a more general 
turn towards these types of remedies. For some of the prior works that have 
addressed EDRs in the context of anti-discrimination law, see supra note 179.  
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situated to avoid many of the obstacles to litigant success that 
are posed by the restrictive and widely shared public views re-
garding discrimination. Of course, as with any proposed ap-
proach, there are also likely to be some drawbacks to increased 
focus on EDRs. Below, I briefly elaborate on the definition of 
EDRs (as it is used herein), followed by a more extended dis-
cussion of the general benefits and drawbacks of increased use 
of EDR approaches. 
1. Defining Extra-Discrimination Remedies 
It is helpful to begin by adopting a tailored definition of ex-
tra-discrimination remedies (EDRs). After all, construed literal-
ly, EDRs can include virtually any approach to remedying prob-
lems of group-based inequality that are not founded in 
discrimination claims. Thus, for example, policy-based anti-
poverty initiatives, just-cause legislation, and anti-
standardized testing initiatives can all be considered forms of 
EDRs. Using the term in this broad sense, however, runs the 
risk of analytical incoherence and vastly exceeds the scope of 
what it is possible to address in the context of a single Article. 
Thus, my focus herein is on the potential advantages (and 
drawbacks) of one specific type of EDR—those EDRs that pro-
vide a litigation-based remedy.  
So what types of litigation-based remedies might qualify as 
EDRs? Drawing on existing statutory and common law tem-
plates,217 such remedies might include: 
 “Just cause” remedies—In those states that have just-
cause legislation (or a similar common law cause of ac-
tion), employers cannot terminate an employee without 
just cause (e.g., employee misconduct or performance is-
sues).218 Just-cause claims—where they are available—
 
 217. I should note that while my focus is on existing litigation-based EDRs 
( litigation-based EDRs which have already been adopted or are being consid-
ered for adoption in one or more jurisdictions in the United States), in many 
cases such EDRs would need to be legislatively adopted in a more significant 
number of jurisdictions in order to be of substantial use to discrimination liti-
gants. See infra Part IV.D. 
 218. See, e.g., Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 39-2-901 et seq. (2011). While “just cause” legislation would provide the 
most significant protections for employees who experience unwarranted ter-
minations, many states have developed more limited common law protections 
through expanded tort or contract-based remedies. For an overview of the 
types of common law protections that have been developed in various states, 
 2012] LIMITS OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 1343 
 
provide an obvious alternative (or adjunct) to discrimina-
tory termination claims, as discrimination victims virtu-
ally always contend that the reasons for their firing were 
not justified. Moreover, termination claims comprise al-
most two-thirds of contemporary discrimination claims, 
and thus just-cause claims (if broadly available) would 
cover a substantial proportion of the claims being 
brought by putative victims of discrimination.219  
 Family and Medical Leave Act-type statutes—The Fami-
ly and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and similar state stat-
utes provide for legally protected paid or unpaid leave 
and benefits for those with caretaking responsibilities, 
pregnant women, and/or people with serious medical 
conditions.220 These types of statutes help solve the prob-
lem of structural barriers to employment for women and 
people with disabilities by creating entitlements to a cer-
tain amount of “full time/face time” flexibility221 and paid 
or unpaid leave (both of which are often required to a 
greater extent by women and people with disabilities). 
As a result, FMLA-type remedies can serve as an adjunct 
(or alternative) claim in an array of situations involving 
the impact of structural discrimination on women and 
people with disabilities. 
 Healthy workplace laws—Healthy workplace laws make 
employers responsible for all on-the-job harassment, ir-
respective of the discriminatory motivation of the har-
assers.222 As reflected in current EEOC filings, harass-
 
see Benjamin B. Dunford & Dennis J. Devine, Employment At-Will and Em-
ployee Discharge: A Justice Perspective on Legal Action Following Termina-
tion, 51 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 903, 907–16 (1998). 
 219. See, e.g., John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Na-
ture of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015 
(1991). 
 220. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et 
seq. (2006); see also Federal vs. State Medical Leave Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF LA-
BOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/fmla/index.htm ( last visited May 10, 2012) 
(providing links to the twelve jurisdictions with state-level FMLA laws). 
 221. I borrow this term from Michelle Travis, who has properly noted that 
the presumed “full time/face time” norm has a significant adverse impact on 
women and people with disabilities. See Travis, supra note 180. 
 222. Professor David Yamada has written extensively on this issue and has 
drafted a model law that is currently under consideration in a number of 
states. See David C. Yamada, The Phenomenon of “Workplace Bullying” and 
the Need for Status-Blind Hostile Work Environment Protection, 88 GEO. L.J. 
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ment is one of the predominant complaints raised by pu-
tative victims of discrimination, comprising a component 
of roughly one-third of all discrimination charges.223 
Thus, healthy workplace laws could provide a significant 
adjunct or alternative to discrimination-based harass-
ment claims.  
 School-based anti-bullying legislation—School-based an-
ti-bullying legislation, like healthy workplace laws, 
makes institutions responsible for student-on-student or 
teacher-on-student harassment, often without regard to 
whether the harassment was motivated by discrimina-
tion.224 Like healthy workplace laws, anti-bullying stat-
utes can provide an alternative (or adjunct) to existing 
discrimination-based claims, where the plaintiff has been 
subjected to harassment based on their protected class 
status. 
 Common law claims—A wide array of common law 
claims, from intentional infliction of emotional distress 
to wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, can be 
 
475 passim (2000) (discussing the problem, analyzing existing legal theories, 
and proposing a legislative solution); David C. Yamada, Workplace Bullying 
and American Employment Law: A Ten-Year Progress Report and Assessment, 
32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 251 passim (2010) [hereinafter Yamada, Work-
place Bullying] (describing the prior ten years of progress regarding workplace 
bullying and providing and analyzing model legislation, “The Healthy Work-
place Bill,” aimed at combating workplace bullying). While no state has yet 
enacted these types of laws, they have been introduced in a number of states 
and are under active consideration in New York as well as other locales. See 
Mike Schlicht & Tom Witt, Bipartisan Consensus at Last, ITHICA J., June 1, 
2010 (Viewpoints), available at 2010 WLNR 11069671; Yamada, Workplace 
Bullying, supra, at 252. 
 223. Compare Charge Statistics: FY 1997–FY 2011, EEOC, http://www.eeoc 
.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm ( last visited May 10, 2012) 
(99,947 total charges in FY 2011), with Harassment Charges, EEOC & FEPAs 
Combined: FY 1997–FY 2011, EEOC, http://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/statistics/ 
enforcement/harassment.cfm ( last visited May 10, 2012) (30,512 harassment 
charges in FY 2011). 
 224. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1(2)(A)(X) (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 10-222d (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4 et seq. (West Supp. 
2011); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/10-20.14 et seq. (2006); LA. REV. STAT. 
§ 17:416.13 et seq. (Supp. 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F et seq. (Lex-
isNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18A:37-13–18 (West 2010); N.Y. EDUC. LAW 
§ 2801-a (McKinney 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70 §§ 24-100.2–100.5 (West 
2005 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 339.351–364 (West Supp. 2011); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-21-24 (West 2011)); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16 § 565 
(2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285 (West 2011); W.VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 18-2C et seq. (LexisNexis 2008 & Supp. 2011).  
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used to hold individual wrong-doers (and sometimes 
their employers) responsible for wrongful conduct target-
ing a putative victim of discrimination.225 Discrimination 
victims already fairly commonly include such claims in 
litigation, where they are available under the specific ju-
risprudence of the jurisdiction in which the case arose.226 
 Retaliation claims—Retaliation claims can be brought 
under all of the major discrimination laws if an employer 
has taken action against an employee for complaining 
about discrimination or otherwise pursing discrimination 
claims.227 Retaliation claims can be characterized as a 
hybrid EDR/discrimination claim, insofar as they are 
predicated on the employee’s opposition to what they 
perceived as discrimination, but do not require a judge or 
jury to find that the individual was actually discriminat-
ed against.228 As is illustrated by EEOC charge statistics, 
retaliation claims already serve as a frequent adjunct to 
discrimination claims, with roughly one-third of all 
charges raising a retaliation claim.229 
Thus, litigation-based EDRs can take a diversity of forms 
in addressing contemporary problems of group-based inequali-
ty—forms that will vary depending on context and on the group 
inequality to be addressed. Through this diversity of forms, 
 
 225. See sources cited infra note 226; see also Dunford & Devine, supra 
note 218 (describing the array of approaches that states have taken to just-
cause common law claims). 
 226. See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgendered 
Employees, in REPRESENTING LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDERED 
CLIENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA 81, 99–102 (2009) (discussing the ways that com-
mon law claims have been utilized to protect the rights of LGBT victims of 
harassment and discrimination); Julie Gannon Shoop, Common Law Claims 
Gain Favor in Job Discrimination Cases, TRIAL, Feb. 1996, at 75, 75–76 (de-
scribing litigants opting to pursue state common law claims rather than Title 
VII claims in federal court); Jason E. Pirruccello, Note, Contingent Worker 
Protection From Client Company Discrimination: Statutory Coverage, Gaps, 
and the Role of the Common Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 191, 194, 206–222 (2005) 
(describing an array of common law claims that could provide a cause of action 
for independent contractors who experience on-the-job discrimination or har-
assment). 
 227. See Retaliation, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/retaliation.cfm 
( last visited May 10, 2012). 
 228. Under existing retaliation doctrine, an employee does not have to 
prove that he or she was actually discriminated against in order to prevail. Id. 
 229. See Charge Statistics: FY 1997–FY 2011, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm ( last visited Jan. 25, 2012). 
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EDRs could potentially be used by many putative victims of 
discrimination as an alternative or adjunct to discrimination 
claims, allowing them to raise claims that do not involve fram-
ing the issue as one of “discrimination.”230 
2. Potential Benefits of Extra-Discrimination Remedies 
So what are the potential benefits of EDRs from the per-
spective of a putative victim of discrimination? Most obviously, 
such approaches obviate the need for a judge or jury to make a 
determination that a particular set of facts is (or could be) dis-
crimination. Because the operative issue under EDRs is not 
whether a particular individual has been discriminated 
against—but rather whether the set of facts presented can ful-
fill a distinct (and typically more straightforward) set of statu-
tory or judicial requirements—the difficult and psychologically 
contingent question of whether discrimination truly took place 
need not be resolved. 
The findings of psychology scholars suggest that this dis-
tinction is likely to make a substantial difference in the adjudi-
cation of the claims of putative victims of discrimination. Thus, 
for example, existing mental prototypes or templates—a factor 
that has been documented to significantly diminish most peo-
ple’s willingness to make attributions to discrimination—are 
likely to instead be helpful to many EDR litigants.231 For exam-
 
 230. Of course, litigation-based EDRs will not always be available as an 
alternative (or adjunct) to discrimination claims. For example, to the extent 
that scholars have decried the lack of a strong disparate impact doctrine in 
contemporary anti-discrimination law, this problem is unlikely to be fully re-
solved by litigation-based EDRs (although it may certainly be partially ad-
dressed through piecemeal approaches, as evidenced by the success of FMLA-
style laws). See supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text. It may be that pol-
icy-based approaches or broad-based social change will be necessary to effec-
tuate the types of sweeping changes in the disparate impact area that advo-
cates and scholars would like to see occur. Similarly, EDRs are unlikely to be 
able to provide a meaningful alternative for those few discrimination cases 
that are based on class or collective claims. Cf. Nielsen et al., Individual Jus-
tice, supra note 27, at 189 (showing that class and collective claims comprise a 
very small proportion of all discrimination claims litigated, and that such 
claims are among the most successful discrimination claims (and thus may not 
require supplementation through EDRs)). Nevertheless, litigation-based EDRs 
are likely to be a possibility in many of the areas in which discrimination liti-
gants currently bring individualized claims. 
 231. See supra notes 137–43 and accompanying text. Obviously, different 
prototypes may be activated by different EDRs, and thus the influence of this 
factor will not be monolithic. However, it appears that for some of the major 
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ple, as the work of Pauline Kim and others has shown, most 
employees have expansive beliefs about non-just-cause termi-
nations, believing that a wide array of factually unjustified fir-
ings are unfair and unlawful, despite the fact that at-will em-
ployment remains the norm in most states.232 Similarly, many 
individuals have expansive views of what constitutes retaliato-
ry behavior—views that tend to be far more expansive than 
corresponding views regarding what constitutes discrimina-
tion.233 Thus, the prototypes that judges and jurors have in rela-
tion to many EDRs are likely to be much more plaintiff-
favorable than commonly held discrimination prototypes. Inso-
far as the work of psychology scholars suggests that such proto-
types influence outcomes, EDRs are thus likely to be better sit-
uated than discrimination claims to prevail.234 
For similar reasons, preexisting beliefs about the common-
ality or rarity of a particular type of illegal or illicit behavior—
beliefs that, as described above, typically decrease willingness 
to make attributions to discrimination—are unlikely to have a 
comparable effect on the adjudication of many EDRs.235 Thus, 
 
EDRs, including “just cause” litigation, this factor may help—rather than 
hurt—claimants. 
 232. See Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influ-
ences on Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447 passim. 
 233. Certainly, the spate of recent Supreme Court decisions broadly con-
struing retaliation law (during a time frame when the Court has been less 
than expansive in its construction of discrimination law generally), are sug-
gestive that the Court itself has a broader understanding of retaliatory behav-
ior than its accompanying views of discrimination. See, e.g., Thompson v. N. 
Am. Stainless, 131 S. Ct. 863, 867–70 (2011) (holding that terminating an em-
ployee’s fiancé in retaliation for conduct protected under Title VII violates Ti-
tle VII’s retaliation provision, and that fiancé was a “person aggrieved” enti-
tled to sue under Title VII); Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson 
Cnty., 555 U.S. 271, 276–80 (2009) (holding that an employee who participated 
in an employer-initiated discrimination investigation was protected against 
retaliation under Title VII); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 
U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (construing Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision as provid-
ing broader coverage than its anti-discrimination provision, and holding that 
retaliation provision encompasses all “materially adverse” retaliatory actions, 
even where they do not affect the terms or conditions of employment).  
 234. See supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text.  
 235. See supra note 144–46 and accompanying text. Again, this factor—
namely, individuals’ preexisting beliefs about the commonality or rarity of a 
particular type of illegal behavior—will not have a monolithic impact, but in-
stead will vary depending on the EDR that is relied upon. However, there is 
again data that suggests that many significant EDRs may be better situated 
than discrimination claims vis-à-vis this issue. 
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while it is well-documented that the general public tends to be-
lieve that discrimination is rare (and that this view tends to de-
crease attributions to discrimination in individual cases), a 
very significant proportion of the American public has personal-
ly experienced a termination or layoff that they believe was un-
fair (i.e., not for just cause or due to company fault).236 Similar-
ly, illegal or unethical corporate behavior, as a general matter, 
is perceived as relatively common by the American public, a 
finding that is perhaps unsurprising in the milieu of Enron and 
Bernie Madoff.237 Thus, unlike discrimination—which is widely 
thought of as rare today—the illegal or illicit behaviors ad-
dressed by many EDRs are thought of as common. As a result, 
this factor is likely to actually benefit many EDR plaintiffs, or at 
a minimum, not stand as a hindrance to EDR plaintiffs’ success.  
Finally, existing psychological research suggests that meri-
tocracy beliefs—perhaps the lynchpin of most individuals’ un-
willingness to make attributions to discrimination—simply are 
not challenged by attributions to unfairness or other types of 
impropriety in the same way they are by allegations of discrim-
ination. Psychology scholars have documented that claims of 
 
 236. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind et al., The Winding Road from Employee to 
Complainant: Situational and Psychological Determinants of Wrongful-
Termination Claims, 45 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 557, 568, 571 (2000) (in survey of un-
employed adults, 34% believed that their employer was at fault in the termi-
nation, and mean response by study respondents indicated a general percep-
tion that terminations were unfair); see also JESSICA GODOFSKY ET AL., JOHN 
J. HELDRICH CTR. FOR WORKFORCE DEV., RUTGERS UNIV., WORK TRENDS: 
AMERICAN WORKERS ASSESS AN ECONOMIC DISASTER 9 (2010), available at 
http://http://www.heldrich.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/content/Work_Trends
_September_2010.pdf (finding that the majority of Americans believe the un-
employed are out of work due to no fault of their own); Rich Morin, Most ‘Re-
employed’ Workers Say They’re Overqualified for Their New Job, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Sept. 2, 2010), available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1718/re-employed-
workers-recession-satisfaction-job-qualification (reporting data showing that many 
workers have experienced a job loss in recent years). 
 237. See Questions and Answers About Enron: How is the American Public 
Reacting to the Enron Crisis?, GALLUP NEWS SERV. (Feb. 14, 2002), http://www 
.gallup.com/poll/5332/questions-answers-about-enron.aspx (reporting poll re-
sponses showing that 75% of respondents believed that the types of activities 
that were engaged in by Enron also exist at “some” or “most” other large cor-
porations; also showing that only 16% rated the honesty and ethics of business 
executives as “high” or “very high”); see also Ethics Impact Employment and 
Productivity, MGMT. WORLD (Jan./Feb. 2009), http://cob.jmu.edu/icpm/ 
management_world/AllJan09.pdf (one in four survey respondents indicated 
that within the past six months they had witnessed unethical or illegal behav-
ior in their own workplaces). 
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discrimination trigger uniquely hostile responses from observ-
ers and that claims of generic unfairness (or other attributions 
that are not localized in discrimination) attract far less hostili-
ty.238 For example, while individuals who make attributions to 
discrimination are often stereotyped as difficult, unpleasant, 
and undesirable to work with, people who make attributions to 
other causes (including simple unfairness or the difficulty of 
the task) are evaluated significantly more favorably.239 This 
phenomenon, moreover, appears to be directly linked to meri-
tocracy beliefs, with the level of hostility expressed towards 
those who make attributions to discrimination—but not other 
causes—varying considerably based on the strength of the ob-
server’s meritocracy beliefs (and/or based on whether the ob-
server has been primed with meritocracy beliefs).240  
 
 238. See, e.g., Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 47–50 
(summarizing the results of prior studies, which had found that those who at-
tribute a lack of success to discrimination are derogated much more signifi-
cantly by research subjects than those who attribute to other causes); Kaiser 
& Miller, Stop Complaining, supra note 118, at 258, 261 (demonstrating that 
subjects rated an African American as more hypersensitive, emotional, argu-
mentative, irritating, troublemaking and complaining when he attributed his 
failure to discrimination, even where there was significant evidence of discrim-
ination; also showing that attribution to other external causes (such as diffi-
culty of the test) did not result in increased derogation as compared to internal 
causes (such as answer quality)); see also Shelton & Stewart, supra note 97, at 
220–21 (showing a statistically significant correlation between confronting 
discrimination and being perceived as a “complainer,” and an inverse correla-
tion between discrimination confrontation and being perceived as a “good per-
son,” but finding no statistically significant trends in perception of confronters 
where women confronted “offensive” but nondiscriminatory comments). But cf. 
Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson, Empirical Research and Civil Jury 
Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497, 1507 (2003) (reporting findings that 
jurors are, as a general matter, suspicious of plaintiffs of all kinds because of a 
perception that the fact of bringing a lawsuit is counter to the ethic of individ-
ual responsibility). 
 239. See, e.g., Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97 at 47–50; 
Kaiser & Miller, Stop Complaining, supra note 118, at 258, 261; see also Shel-
ton & Stewart, supra note 97, at 220–21 (finding similar results when individ-
uals confront discriminatory comments).  
 240. See, e.g., Kaiser, Dominant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 54–57 
(summarizing results of a number of studies showing that meritocracy beliefs 
moderate psychological threat responses to attributions of discrimination, but 
do not have a comparable effect in the context of attributions to other causes); 
Kaiser et al., Why Are Attributions to Discrimination Costly, supra note 106, at 
1527, 1531 (reporting experimental results showing that meritocracy beliefs 
moderate the extent of derogation directed at individuals who make attribu-
tions to discrimination but do not moderate the extent of derogation directed at 
individuals who make attributions to other causes, including simple unfairness).  
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The reason for this disparity in responses appears to be 
relatively straightforward—while claims of discrimination raise 
the specter of systematic deviations from meritocratic norms 
and thus trigger defensive responses, as discussed in Part II—
claims of simple unfairness or violation of technical legal norms 
do not.241 In essence, illegal discrimination is perceived to be 
part of a wider societal phenomenon (group-based bias against 
particular groups), whereas other forms of unfairness or illegal-
ity (including arbitrary—but nondiscriminatory—employer ac-
tions) are perceived as non-systematic and thus unthreatening 
to the global prevalence of meritocracy.242 As a result, attribu-
tions to unfairness or violations of technical legal norms do not 
trigger the types of psychological responses (such as rationali-
zation, victim blame, and denial) that are triggered in the con-
text of attributions to discrimination.243 
Thus, all three of the factors that psychology scholars have 
identified as playing a role in the reluctance of most individuals 
to make attributions to discrimination244 are unlikely to have a 
comparable effect in the context of EDRs.245 Moreover, one addi-
tional feature of EDRs—their tendency to impose more concrete 
standards for adjudication than discrimination claims—is like-
ly to further improve EDRs’ success rates vis-à-vis discrimina-
tion claims.246 Indeed, psychology scholars have shown that 
 
 241. See, e.g., Kaiser et al., Why Are Attributions to Discrimination Costly, 
supra note 106, at 1528 (theorizing that discrimination attributions are likely 
to be particularly threatening to meritocracy beliefs because of their global 
implications).  
 242. Id. 
 243. See supra notes 238–40 and accompanying text; see also Kaiser, Dom-
inant Ideology Threat, supra note 97, at 54–55 (discussing studies that have 
found that high endorsers of meritocracy beliefs as well as those primed with 
meritocracy beliefs, experience heightened psychological distress (feeling anx-
ious, nervous, distressed) when witnessing an attribution to discrimination). 
 244. See supra Part II (describing in detail the factors that psychology 
scholars have identified as playing a role in the reluctance of most individuals 
to make attributions to discrimination). 
 245. Cf. Tracey L. Meares, Norms, Legitimacy and Law Enforcement, 79 
OR. L. REV. 391, 398–404 (2000) (in the criminal law context, arguing that pol-
icies that harness existing norms rather than relying on a pure deterrence 
model are more likely to succeed).  
 246. For example, one type of FMLA claim (albeit not the only type) looks 
simply at whether the employer has complied with legally specified leave and 
reinstatement requirements in order to determine liability. For a description 
of the FMLA and its requirements, see Family and Medical Leave Act, U.S. 
DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/ ( last visited May 10, 2012). Simi-
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well-defined and non-ambiguous constraints on decision-making 
(often referred to as “strong situations”) can be significantly 
more effective at constraining psychological biases (and other in-
dividualized factors) than the type of weak constraints found in 
discrimination laws.247 Thus, even if judges and jurors do have 
biases regarding EDR claims, the presence of strong constraints 
may make the effectuation of those biases less likely.248  
 
larly, many just-cause regimes impose liability based on an employer’s failure 
to comply with its own written termination procedures, an inquiry that will 
often (but not always) involve the application of a more concrete set of con-
straints. See, e.g., Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 39-2-904 (2011) (defining a discharge as wrongful where “the employer 
violated the express provisions of its own written personnel policy.”). 
 247. See, e.g., William H. Cooper & Michael J. Withey, The Strong Situa-
tion Hypothesis, 13 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 62, 62–64, 70 (2009) 
(describing the hypothesis, noting that it is widespread, but cautioning that 
existing research does not currently provide adequate empirical support to 
confirm the hypothesis); Kahan, supra note 193, at 774–75, 796 (finding that 
very clear explicit legal standards do have some impact on outcomes, even 
where jurors have strong underlying background views); Rustin D. Meyer et 
al., A Review and Synthesis of Situational Strength in the Organizational Sci-
ences, 36 J. MGMT. 121, 133–34 (2010) (providing a meta-analysis of the litera-
ture and finding some support for the strong situation hypothesis). Although it 
appears that strong situations do restrain the impact of preexisting back-
ground views and biases, they are not entirely effective at eliminating the in-
fluences of underlying beliefs. For example, even in the presence of a very spe-
cific jury instruction apparently requiring conviction, Dan Kahan found that 
more than one third of study participants continued to act in accordance with 
their preexisting (and inconsistent) views regarding the meaning of “rape.” See 
Kahan, supra, at 795–97.  
 248. One could also argue based on this literature that the anti-
discrimination laws should be amended to provide more concrete constraints. 
The most obvious such amendment would modify the law to provide for a “pre-
text only” regime, i.e., a regime in which the judge or juror is required to find 
discrimination upon a determination that the reason the employer has given 
for the termination was not the true reason. (This, of course, is an approach 
which has been rejected by the Supreme Court, see St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514–15 (1993), but Congress could adopt such an ap-
proach through legislative action.) Alternatively, a judge or juror could be re-
quired to make a finding of discrimination where the employer has made re-
marks that are indicative of group bias (although this is an approach that 
even many progressives—including myself—might find discomforting). While 
there is some theoretical appeal to these types of approaches, there are real 
risks in attempting to force judges and jurors to classify a particular factual 
circumstance as discrimination when their intuitive views are strongly diver-
gent from that understanding. As an initial matter, while strong constraints 
have been shown to have some effect on outcomes, there remain a substantial 
number of decision-makers who will follow their preexisting beliefs. See, e.g., 
Kahan, supra note 193, at 774–75, 796 (experimentally demonstrating this 
phenomenon in the criminal law context). Moreover, crafting a legal discrimi-
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Initial empirical findings suggest that the foregoing ad-
vantages of EDRs are far from merely theoretical. As Kevin 
Clermont and Stewart Schwab have documented, FMLA 
claims—which provide structural remedies for inequality-based 
problems without requiring findings of group-based discrimina-
tion—fare far better than discrimination claims.249 Thus, for 
example, FMLA claimants win pretrial adjudications at rough-
ly 4 times the rate of discrimination litigants, and prevail at 
trial in roughly 60% of cases, as compared to the roughly 30–
35% trial victory rates of discrimination litigants.250 Indeed, the 
overall “win” rate for FMLA litigants is close to double the win 
rates for discrimination claimants (win rates that are strikingly 
similar (and low) across all of the various discrimination stat-
utes, including Title VII, the ADA, § 1981 and the ADEA).251 
These results—a double or more success rate for FMLA claim-
 
nation regime that is increasingly divergent from public understandings of 
discrimination seems likely to only increase the problem of doctrinal drift dis-
cussed in supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text. Finally, forcing decision-
makers to apply a specific definition of discrimination that does not comport to 
public understandings seems likely to only exacerbate the public perception of 
discrimination litigation (and litigants) as predominantly frivolous. Thus, to 
the extent that similar ends can be achieved without requiring the classifica-
tion of the ultimate event as discrimination (for example, through just-cause 
legislation, which imposes an even higher standard on employers than a “pre-
text only” regime), this approach seems preferable to trying to further define 
“discrimination” under the law in ways that profoundly diverge from common 
understandings. Cf. Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an 
At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1679 (1996) (arguing that the presence of 
discrimination protections, coupled with a lack of just-cause termination pro-
tections in most states, may funnel claims which are more properly character-
ized in just-cause terms into discrimination causes of action); Michael Selmi, 
Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 782 (2006) 
(characterizing as one of two “critical mistakes” underlying disparate impact 
the notion “that it was possible to redefine discrimination purely through legal 
doctrine” and noting that the redefinition of discrimination in law has not led 
to a similar redefinition in public opinion).  
 249. Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, supra note 
27, at 445.  
 250. See id. In the case of bench trials alone, the disparities are even more 
striking, with 80% of FMLA claimants prevailing before judges as compared to 
a 20–25% success rate for discrimination litigants. Id. In calculating figures 
based on the data provided by Clermont and Schwab, I omitted § 1983 claims, 
as it was unclear whether such claims were exclusively discrimination-related 
or also included other forms of constitutional or statutory claims that can be 
brought pursuant to § 1983. 
 251. As noted, supra note 30, the overall win rates for virtually all classes 
of discrimination litigants are very similar and cluster around ten or eleven 
percent. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
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ants as compared to discrimination litigants—are striking and 
suggest that there may in fact be substantial advantages to 
EDRs.252  
 
Figure 3 
Trial Win Rates: Discrimination Plaintiffs v. EDR Plaintiffs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While there is less extensive data on the success rates of 
litigants bringing just-cause claims, existing studies strongly 
suggest that the success rates of such litigants also substantial-
ly exceed the success rates of discrimination litigants.253 Thus, 
 
 252. The comparative success of FMLA claimants may explain why preg-
nancy and other family responsibilities discrimination claims have a much 
higher success rate than other forms of discrimination claims. See, e.g., MARY 
C. STILL, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, UNIV. OF CAL. HASTINGS COLL. OF LAW, 
LITIGATING THE MATERIAL WALL: U.S. LAWSUITS CHARGING DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST WORKERS WITH FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES 13–14 (2006), available at 
http://worklifelaw.org/pubs/FRDreport.pdf (highlighting the high win rates in 
family responsibilities discrimination cases when compared to win rates in 
traditional employment discrimination cases). Since such claims can often be 
brought under both the FMLA and Title VII, they typically will have a basis 
both in EDRs and in discrimination law. I am unaware of any author that has 
disaggregated family responsibilities discrimination by statutory basis of 
claim to try to determine whether the increased incidence of success is an arti-
fact of the prevalence of FMLA claims in that context.  
 253. See, e.g., Oppenheimer, supra note 147, at 516, 518, 520–22, 524 (de-
scribing prior studies of common law just-cause claims at trial, which had con-
sistently found success rates in the 60–70% range); S. Richard Pincus, Final 
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existing studies of trial victory rates (the primary area that has 
been studied for just-cause claims) have repeatedly found that 
plaintiffs prevail at trial on statutory or common law just-cause 
claims at a rate of roughly 60–70%.254 This success rate is very 
similar to the FMLA success rate found by Clermont and 
Schwab,255 and vastly exceeds the trial success rates experi-
enced by any class of discrimination litigants. 
Finally, retaliation claims brought under the anti-
discrimination laws—which have characteristics of both a dis-
crimination claim and an EDR—appear to have success rates at 
trial that are slightly lower than the success rates of FMLA and 
just-cause litigants but that remain substantially higher than 
the success rates of discrimination litigants.256 Thus, retaliation 
claims—which do not ask the judge and jury to make an ulti-
mate finding of discrimination, but which often rely to some ex-
tent on the reasonableness of an employee’s perception that 
discrimination occurred—appear to fall somewhere between 
true EDRs and discrimination claims in their level of success. 
 
and Binding Arbitration: A Sensible Alternative to Expensive Employment Lit-
igation, 22 J. HEALTH L. 343, 343 n.5 (1989) (citing to study reporting a 64% 
success rate for wrongful discharge cases at trial); cf. supra note 250 and ac-
companying text (discussing trial success rates for discrimination claimants, 
which have generally been reported in the 30–35% range). 
 254. See Oppenheimer, supra note 147, at 516, 518, 520–22, 524; Pincus, 
supra note 253, at 343 n.5. 
 255. See Clermont & Schwab, How Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, supra 
note 27, at 445.  
 256. There is relatively little data on how retaliation claims fare in court. 
However, news reports suggest a trial victory rate of roughly 57%. Wendy Hy-
land, Equal Opportunity for Employers: Elevating the Adverse Employment 
Action Standard to Allow Only Meritorious Retaliation Claims, 90 KY. L.J. 
273, 277 n.19 (2001); see also Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: 
Unreasonable Bias or Biased Reasoning, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166, 
191 n.132 (2000) (discussing an analysis performed for USA Today by Jury 
Verdict Research showing that individuals who file retaliation lawsuits win 
more cases than victims of “age, disability, race or sex discrimination”); Scott 
A. Moss, Against “Academic Deference”: How Recent Developments in Employ-
ment Discrimination Law Undercut an Already Dubious Doctrine, 27 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 3 n.3 (2006) (noting that retaliation claims are 
the most successful type of employment discrimination claims). See generally 
Erin E. Buzuvis, Sidelined: Title IX Retaliation Cases and Women’s Leader-
ship in College Athletics, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 38–45 (2010) (argu-
ing that the retaliation cause of action has operated to fill existing gaps in the 
vitality of challenges to sex discrimination in the specific context of Title IX 
and athletics). 
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Of course, none of the data described above was collected 
as part of an analysis designed to test the comparative efficacy 
of EDRs and discrimination claims, much less as part of a 
study designed to ascertain the causes of any disparity in suc-
cess rates. Thus, they cannot answer the ultimate question of 
whether EDRs are more effective than discrimination claims in 
similar factual circumstances, or whether any comparative ad-
vantage of such claims results from the lesser salience of the 
type of background beliefs that have been found to be associat-
ed with resistance to making attributions to discrimination.257 
Moreover, no existing analysis has addressed the issue of how 
lawsuits involving concurrent EDR and discrimination claims 
fare (whether, for example, a concurrent EDR claim raises the 
likelihood of success on a discrimination claim, or conversely, 
whether EDR claims fare worse when brought together with 
discrimination claims). Thus, further research is necessary to 
answer many substantial questions regarding the potential 
utility of EDR claims. Nevertheless, existing data provides con-
siderable reasons to believe that EDR claims are significantly 
more likely to result in successful outcomes for litigants than 
traditional discrimination causes of action. 
 
 257. For a discussion of the findings of psychology scholars regarding indi-
viduals’ resistance to making attributions to discrimination and the back-
ground beliefs that have been found to play a role in this phenomenon, see su-
pra Part II. 
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3. Possible Critiques of Extra-Discrimination Remedies258 
Even if EDRs are more effective than discrimination reme-
dies, there may, of course, still be a number of critiques to plac-
ing increased focus on their use. Among the most compelling of 
such critiques is the lost moral valence of moving away from 
claims of discrimination towards an increased focus on claims 
that are—by their very nature—designed to be less morally and 
socially charged. Most individuals who are deeply invested in 
the anti-discrimination enterprise—including scholars, advo-
cates, and litigants—care about redressing discrimination pre-
cisely because it is discrimination. Whether some abstract 
technical violation of the law has occurred often matters little 
(if at all) to the emotional and moral salience of the alleged 
wrongdoing.  
The most compelling response to such arguments—at least 
on an individual level—is that there are precious few moral vic-
tories for victims of discrimination in the current state of af-
fairs. Certainly, for the significant number of litigants who lose 
their cases outright (on motion practice or at trial, for example), 
there is no moral justice. And, for those who settle, moral victo-
ries are often also in short supply.259 Indeed, few would contend 
that receiving $30,000 in exchange for signing an agreement 
that typically requires promises of secrecy, agreements not to 
disparage the employer or voluntarily help other victims of dis-
crimination, and that is larded with employer refutations that 
 
 258. For each of the individual EDRs mentioned here, there is an extensive 
literature addressing its merits and drawbacks from an individualized per-
spective. See generally, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at 
Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984) (making arguments in support of the em-
ployment at will); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforceability 
of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913 (1996) 
(discussing the relative merits of legally imposed workplace regulations as 
compared to those that are based on informal norms, with particular attention 
paid to just-cause regimes/norms); Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad 
for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2010) (critiquing the American approach to reconciling 
work-family conflict and suggesting that such an approach may be partially 
responsible for the United States’ inadequate maternity leave policies). My 
discussion herein does not extend to such critiques, but is limited to critiques 
of the general concept of making increased use of EDRs as a means of improv-
ing the odds of success for putative victims of discrimination. Whether a spe-
cific EDR is advisable from perspectives other than the potential benefit to pu-
tative victims of discrimination is a complex question that would, of course, 
need to be fully engaged before proceeding with specific legislative action. 
 259. See infra note 260 and accompanying text. 
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any discrimination ever took place constitutes a moral victo-
ry.260 Even for those few clients that have won major trial victo-
ries—purportedly the ultimate form of moral vindication—the 
seemingly never-ending cycle of post trial motions and appeals 
blunts the moral force of victory, and dispels any notion that 
the employer has truly “learned” anything. In short, there is lit-
tle likelihood of moral gain for individual victims of discrimina-
tion, while there is much to lose in defeat. 
While critiques of lost moral valence thus have little power 
on an individual level, they are worth taking more seriously on 
a global level. After all, the abandonment of a principal focus 
on discrimination (in academia, in litigation, or in advocacy) 
can only hasten the already sturdy perception of discrimination 
as a rare and aberrant phenomenon that need not preoccupy 
our attentions today. Such an outcome obviously disserves the 
interests of discrimination victims, insofar as it would predict-
ably lead to even further deterioration of support for efforts to 
remediate discrimination (whether on a global or individual 
scale). It would be ironic, to say the least, if efforts to better 
serve putative victims of discrimination contributed to the de-
mise of the most stalwart protector of such victims—
discrimination laws themselves.261  
As a result, it seems clear that some balance between the 
remedies that will most effectively serve putative victims of 
discrimination now and the strategies that will most effectively 
enhance the public salience of discrimination in the long-term 
is needed in pursuing discrimination reform.262 As we learn 
 
 260. Cf. Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice, supra note 2, at 16, 33 (noting 
that defendants, even post-settlement, consistently maintain that no discrimina-
tion took place and that their decision to settle was purely pragmatic). 
 261. Derrick Bell has made a similar point in calling for increased focus on 
pursuing equality by “forging fortuity” outside of the confines of discrimination 
doctrine, while noting that we neglect formal discrimination protections at our 
peril. See DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 
AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 189–93 (2004). 
 262. I should be clear that there are certain circumstances in which this 
balance will obviously weigh in favor of focusing energies on discrimination 
approaches. Most notably, in circumstances where a group (such as lesbi-
an/gay/bisexual/transgender employees) has not yet achieved statutory anti-
discrimination protections, it seems clear that the primary objective must be 
to obtain such protections (although EDR claims may be helpful—and indeed 
sometimes the only alternative—in obtaining redress for current victims of 
discrimination). Put simply, without a statutory baseline rendering discrimi-
nation illegal, concerns about the scope of what people may perceive as dis-
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more about how EDRs operate—whether they are effective as 
an adjunct (as opposed to a substitute) to discrimination claims 
and what types of claims fare best comparatively under EDR-
type approaches—we will be better able to assess when an 
EDR-based approach seems most appropriate, and when dis-
crimination claims (either as an adjunct or alone) remain the 
best approach. Moreover, increased advocacy and publicity 
around the enactment of EDRs should not detract from the con-
tinuing need to publicize compelling instances of discrimination 
and to agitate for broader public understandings of discrimina-
tion’s harms. In short, there is little to lose, and potentially 
much to gain, from pursuing both EDRs and more traditional 
discrimination remedies. 
The question then becomes whether this type of approach 
is practically or politically feasible. After all, while EDRs are 
already available in some jurisdictions in some forms, signifi-
cantly increased reliance on EDRs would require the enactment 
of legislation, which is hardly a trivial enterprise. There are, 
moreover, numerous potential obstacles that one can envision 
to successful efforts to promote such remedies, such as a lack of 
collective focus of advocacy groups (incidental to the wide array 
of potential remedies that such groups could seek to promote), 
and a decreased willingness of constituents and granting agen-
cies to fund non-group based legislative efforts by civil rights 
advocacy groups.  
This Article cannot hope to fully address the political com-
plexities of enacting new EDR legislation. However, a few ob-
 
criminatory are hardly the most central of discrimination victims’ concerns. 
See, e.g., KATIE R. EYER, PROTECTING LESBIAN GAY BISEXUAL AND 
TRANSGENDER (LGBT) WORKERS: STRATEGIES FOR BRINGING EMPLOYMENT 
CLAIMS ON BEHALF OF MEMBERS OF THE LGBT COMMUNITY IN THE ABSENCE OF 
CLEAR STATUTORY PROTECTIONS 18 (2006), available at http://www.acslaw.org/ 
sites/default/files/Eyer_on_Protecting_LGBT_Workers--FINAL_0.pdf (identifying a 
“federal civil rights law prohibiting sexual orientation and gender identity discrim-
ination” as a goal “critical to creating genuine change in working conditions and 
employment opportunities”); Katie R. Eyer, Have We Arrived Yet? LGBT Rights 
and the Limits of Formal Equality, 19 LAW & SEXUALITY 160, 164 (2010) (ar-
guing that “an identity politics model is necessary in order for a legally disfa-
vored group to make the transition to formal legal equality”). Among other 
things, while discrimination law is by no means perfect in deterring real-world 
discrimination, it does have some deterrence effects—effects that would be 
completely lost absent formal anti-discrimination protections. See generally 
supra note 199 (describing research relating to the role of formal anti-
discrimination protections in improving economic outcomes for protected 
groups). 
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servations are worth making here. First, the problem of a dif-
fuse focus that pursuing EDRs brings, while real, should be 
surmountable by effective coalition building and the prioritiza-
tion of the most broadly applicable of reforms. Thus, for exam-
ple, just-cause legislation, whose benefits as an adjunct to dis-
crimination claims would be available to all groups who seek to 
bring discrimination claims, is an obvious place to begin and 
would allow the building of broad coalitions around a single 
movement for change. Such a movement would undoubtedly 
have the advantage of being able to attract the support of oth-
ers beyond the groups traditionally protected by discrimination 
legislation, including workers’ advocacy groups and others 
seeking a fairer and more predictable employment regime.263 
Indeed, existing social science research suggests that EDRs—
precisely because of their broad-based and inclusive nature—
may be among the most politically viable of legislative ap-
proaches to reform.264 
Moreover, to the extent that EDR-related efforts constitute 
only a fraction of the work of civil rights advocacy groups, it 
seems unlikely that they will materially affect the support for 
those organizations. As set forth above, there are good reasons 
for civil rights organizations to continue to engage in a diversi-
ty of approaches, including robust efforts to utilize and further 
expand traditional discrimination remedies.265 And indeed, 
many civil rights organizations already engage in a diversity of 
approaches, including EDR-based advocacy around issues that 
are considered material to their constituents’ equality con-
 
 263. Employers may even be included among those who would support the-
se types of reforms, as employers may prefer the predictability of a fixed legal 
regime to the uncertainty that accompanies the common law regimes that ex-
ist in many states.  
 264. See, e.g., Margaret Weir et al., The Future of Social Policy in the Unit-
ed States: Political Constraints and Possibilities, in THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL 
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 421, 421–45 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988) 
(describing the political difficulties faced by social welfare programs that are 
associated only with poor or minority constituents and describing the en-
hanced political viability of very broad-based social welfare programs); cf. Der-
rick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Di-
lemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523–28(1980) (arguing that the result in Brown 
v. Board of Education was made possible only a result of the convergence of 
the interests of the white majority with the anti-segregation outcome of 
Brown, and that commitment to enforcement waned again when those inter-
ests diverged).  
 265. See supra notes 260–61 and accompanying text. 
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cerns.266 It thus seems profoundly unlikely that further diversi-
fying advocacy efforts will materially harm the support for ad-
vocacy groups that promote civil rights concerns. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the history of efforts to leg-
islatively enact EDRs provides a basis for some hope regarding 
such approaches’ political feasibility, although certainly not for 
unqualified optimism. Many EDRs, including for example 
FMLA-style laws, have been successfully enacted in the past.267 
Moreover, to the extent that efforts to enact such legislation 
have failed, it has often been at least in part because of the 
ambivalence or active resistance of groups (such as unions or 
trial lawyers) that are natural allies, but have nevertheless 
faced context-specific competing concerns.268 Thus, there are 
reasons to believe that EDR-based legislation could achieve po-
litical success (albeit certainly not in all jurisdictions or at all 
times) if backed by a broad-based and sustained coalition of civ-
il rights groups and other progressive allies. At a bare mini-
mum, EDR legislation seems as likely to be politically viable as 
the primary alternative (i.e., significant amendments to the an-
ti-discrimination laws) given the broader-based constituency 
that EDRs would ultimately protect.269 
  CONCLUSION   
Few would dispute that civil rights litigants (and their ad-
vocates) have radically transformed the American social and 
political landscape. Discrimination is today a term with tre-
 
 266. See, e.g., NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., 
http://www.naacpldf.org ( last visited May 10, 2012) (detailing the array of ra-
cial justice work that the LDF is currently working on, including work that is 
not focused on purely discrimination-based remedies). 
 267. See supra notes 220–21 and accompanying text.  
 268. See, e.g., Jack Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment-at-Will, 36 
LAB. L.J. 557, 561–63 (1985) (noting that unions have typically not lobbied on 
behalf of unjust discharge legislation, and that such legislation has been ac-
tively opposed by plaintiff-side trial lawyers in some of the states where it has 
been proposed); see also Chris Bragg, ‘Poison Pill’ Measures Pulled From Bal-
lot, COLO. STATESMAN (Oct. 3, 2008), http://www.coloradostatesman.com/ 
content/%3Fpoison-pill%3F-measures-pulled-ballot (describing a deal between 
Colorado labor and business leaders to remove certain pro-worker initiatives, 
including an initiative that would have required “just cause” for terminations 
in Colorado, from the November 2008 ballot, in exchange for business opposi-
tion to certain anti-union measures on the ballot).  
 269. See supra note 264 and accompanying text. See generally supra Part 
IV.B.2 (discussing the potential benefits of EDRs). 
 2012] LIMITS OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW 1361 
 
mendous social and moral valence that denotes—for most of 
us—a particularly pernicious form of invidious wrong. The 
overwhelming majority of individuals in contemporary Ameri-
can society believe that discrimination is wrong and have vest-
ed conceptions of the forms that this wrong can and does take. 
And yet the work of psychology scholars suggests that it is 
precisely the widespread social valence of discrimination that 
may be driving the difficult odds that discrimination litigants 
face in today’s legal milieu. It is because the public has devel-
oped its own strongly held views about discrimination—views 
that are independent of any technical legal requirements for 
proving discrimination—that the drift of the law towards unfa-
vorable outcomes for discrimination litigants is so intractable 
and so pronounced. For while the public believes that discrimi-
nation is fundamentally wrong, it also believes it is a narrowly 
defined phenomenon: a phenomenon that is aberrational and 
rare in today’s society.  
These findings suggest the need to look beyond traditional 
discrimination claims when seeking to protect the interests of 
putative victims of discrimination. Using extra-discrimination 
remedies (i.e., remedies that do not focus on group-based dis-
crimination claims) provides one such alternate approach. 
While such remedies will undoubtedly not serve as a panacea 
for the difficulties that discrimination claimants face, they 
may—by decoupling the legal inquiry from the emotionally 
loaded terrain of discrimination—significantly improve out-
comes for individual victims of discrimination.  
Thus a “cooler” approach270—by its nature designed to 
avoid the pursuit of moral victories—may be the most effective 
means of improving outcomes for individual victims of discrim-
ination. Such a compromise approach will no doubt—like most 
compromises—be profoundly unsatisfying to those on both 
 
 270. Cf. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 413, 492–98 (1999) (noting that framing criminal law discourse in terms 
of deterrence is often a cover for other more controversial commitments but 
also observing that the cooling effect of relying on a less controversial dis-
course may make it easier for diverse citizens to agree on policy commit-
ments); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and 
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 1470, 1476–77 (2004) (noting that the anti-classification understand-
ing of Brown was adopted in part because it provided a “cooler” and less con-
troversial way of justifying the decision and discussing at length both the 
practical benefits and limitations that the cooler approach entailed).  
 1362 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1275 
 
sides of the discrimination debate. But for individual victims of 
discrimination, it is hard to dispute that outcomes matter. And 
ultimately, what happens to those individual victims—those 
the anti-discrimination regime is designed to serve—must mat-
ter to all of us in looking to the future of anti-discrimination re-
form. 
